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Abstract
Risk measures are the core indicator of risk management and a proper risk assessment model
is essential for successful financial institutions. Value at Risk and Expected Shortfall are
the two most popular and acceptable risk measurement methods presently employed to
assess risks in the financial market. In the past few years, researchers have attempted to
demonstrate that Expected Shortfall performs better against the traditional Value at Risk
method. However, the lack of elicitability and difficult backtesting of this method suggest that
the popularisation of ES might be gradual. This thesis will present a comparison of these two
methods not only from a traditional perspective, such as the measurement of tail risk, but also
form the perspective of risk capital requirement. Through Historical Simulation and Filtered
Historical Simulation, it concludes that switching from Value at Risk to Expected Shortfall
method would reduce risk capital requirement and enhance financial leverage of organisations.
Additionally, this research also combines macroeconomic elements, the financial market and
central banks, and analyses the influence of a positive leverage shock on the macro-economy
through a Global Vector Autoregression model.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Risk measure is the core indicator of risk management and a proper risk assessment model is
essential for successful financial institutions. Value at Risk and Expected Shortfall are the
two most popular and acceptable risk measurement methods employed to assess financial
market risk now-days. VaR is a traditional risk measure that has been widely accepted and
used by financial institutions. While ES is an alternative risk measure that is conceptually
superior to VaR in numerous aspects, especially, with regard to its sensitivity towards tail risk.
However, it has been criticised for the difficulty it presents in backtesting. Since neither of
the methods are perfect, the question arises: if only one method is to be employed to describe
the risk in a particular situation, which one of the two presents the best alternative?
2 Introduction
Risk management protects individuals from various risks such as credit, market, liquidity and
operational risks. This study focuses on market risk measurement and the management of
the banking sector. Dionne (2013) indicated that risk management should encompass more
than mere control and reduction of the impact of risks, diminishing costs related to various
risks and maximisation of firm value. It is vital that effective risk management also enhance
a bank’s capital structure by accurately forecasting risks.
To improve the stability of the financial market, banks must follow the minimum capital
requirement regulation which is stated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS). The minimum capital requirement, also known as capital adequacy, is the amount
of capital banks require to hold in the form of a percentage of risk-weighted assets and is
calculated using a risk assessment model. BCBS shifted its quantitative internal risk model
from VaR to ES in its 2013 revision which stated that: “some weaknesses have been identified
with using VaR for determining regulatory capital requirements, including its inability to
capture tail risk” (BCBS, 2013). Although the reform has been proposed, the extensive
application of ES will still require a long time due to the difficulty involved in its backtesting.
Furthermore, the costs and potential impact of this method on financial institutions may
be significant because this reformation requires substantial modifications in the size and
distribution of capital requirement. Adequate capital reserves have become a significant
concern, in partocular, after the international banking crisis of 2007-2008. Miles et al.
(2013) demonstrated that regulators and banks agree that under equal conditions, efficient
distribution of capital charges is preferred. The allocation of daily capital charges generally
depends on two aspects: (1) the risk measures (ES versus VaR); and (2) the penalty multiplier.
Therefore, banks can improve capital liquidity through the precise capturing and forecasting
of risks.
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In discussing the merits and consequences of VaR and ES I am taking a probabilistic approach
to risk – a view that risk can be captured by a probability distribution constructed from historic
observations. This is the basis of ES and VaR and also of the treatment of risk in a wide range
of contexts in, and, beyond finance. I recognise that this is controversial in some quarters.
Keynes, for example, who understood a great deal about financial markets in both theory
and practice, famously wrote: By "uncertain" knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean
merely to distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable. The game of
roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty; nor is the prospect of a Victory bond
being drawn. Or, again, the expectation of life is only slightly uncertain. Even the weather
is only moderately uncertain. The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the
prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty
years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealth-owners
in the social system in 1970. About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form
any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know (Keynes, 1937). Much the same
distinction had been made earlier by Knight (1921) and formed a central theme of Shackle’s
later work (e.g. Shackle, 2017). The argument that the past cannot be used to estimate the
likelihood of future events features currently in the work of Paul Davidson (2010) and other
Post-Keynesians. However, I am here concerned with the merits of VaR and ES and their
application in a context within which a probabilistic approach to risk is widely-accepted.
1.2 Structure and Methodology
An argument has been raised concerning the risk measures that perform better in practice.
This thesis presents a comparison between VaR and ES methods through three perspectives.
4 Introduction
The background chapter introduces the financial environment of modern risk management
that includes the global economic conditions, development and reforms of the Basel Accord
and some basic concepts concerning risk management. The background chapter further
offers an outline of risk management and emphasises the significance of using proper risk
measures.
The comparison starts from the theoretical level in the following chapter. I compare VaR and
ES in terms of their numerous mathematical properties such as coherence, robustness and
elicitability1. Moreover, their capacities for backtesting and sensitivity against tail risk2 are
also examined in this chapter.
To consider the perspective of optimal bank capital, I utilise the data from 25 most repre-
sentative banks from G7 countries for the year 2017 in chapter 3. An empirical comparison
of VaR and ES is subsequently conducted via Historical Simulation and Filtered Historical
Simulation. Meanwhile, the backtesting of both measures is tested according to the Basel
Accord requirement. Since ES is difficult to backtest, I test the efficiency of ES based on
VaR. Furthermore, I compare the capital requirements of VaR and ES using the outcomes of
HS and FHS respectively as well as their backtesting counterparts.
In the final chapter, a Global Vector Autoregressive (GVAR) model is applied to link the
macro-economy, financial market and central bank together. This chapter also discusses the
correlation between risk measures, risk capital requirement and leverage ratio. Theoretically,
risk reflects not only through stock prices but also through the leverage ratio. A shift in risk
measure could effect a change in leverage ratio. The GVAR model estimates the way in
which the change in leverage ratio impacts the macro-economy through the switch between
1The definition of coherence, elicitability, and robustness will be explained in Section 3.5 Page 25, 29 and
31 in detail.
2The property of tail risk and backtesting will be discussed in Page 28 and 30 respectively.
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risk measures, from VaR to ES. I selected the data in G7 countries to produce the estimation
and forecasting via the GVAR model. Furthermore, a sign restriction approach is applied to
identify the structural shock.
1.3 Contribution
Although several researchers in the past have studied the comparison of VaR and ES, this
thesis considers this question from a new perspective. First, previous research works concen-
trated the comparison of the values of VaR and ES themselves, while I begin with the point of
minimum capital requirement. The distribution of capital is crucial in risk management. The
Basel Accord makes a clear statement regarding the minimum capital requirement of banks
that are based on the risk measurement model. With regard to the values of VaR and ES, ES
is conceptually superior to VaR. However, the consequence may be inverse when the risk
capital requirements are calculated. It is essential to study the value of capital requirements
because setting capital requirement is a major task for regulators, and banks as well as the
macroeconomy benefit from an optimal bank capital arrangement.
Moreover, there is rising concern with regard to the association between macroeconomics
and financial market, especially after the financial crisis of 2007. Economics constitutes a
comprehensive section that comprises both macroeconomics and finance. While macroeco-
nomics refers to behaviours of large segments of markets or countries, finance denotes the
specific ways in which money is created and managed. The previous studies focused on the
influence of risk measures in relation to the financial market alone, while this thesis links
macroeconomics, financial market and central banks together across the GVAR model.
6 Introduction
Lastly, I outline the properties of risk measures and summarise the comparison with regard
to different features.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Global Environment
From the end of 1970, the disorganisation of the Bretton Woods System and the oil price shock
caused severe problems for the global economy. Meanwhile, an increasing interaction of
goods, services and financial markets stimulated economic expansion and brought about the
development of international capital flows and information exchange, exerting an interactive
influence on financial markets. In a global market under such conditions, economic agents
also become vulnerable to additional financial risks, such as inflation, increasing capital
cost, and unstable prices, which slowed down the pace of economic growth. Moreover, the
escalating financial risks in different markets raised fluctuations in the global market. This
scenario makes stakeholders gradually understand the necessity and urgency required to
ensure proper risk management. Furthermore, topics such as financial risk measurement and
economic capital have become the core concerns in research.
8 Background
In the changing financial environment, the current financial market is more complicated
compared to the situation of Basel I. The Basel Committee focused on regular cooperation in
banking supervision. Basel I regulation initially demonstrated that capital operation brings
risks and the risk level of capital always changes. Following this, Basel II regulation offered
updated insight, stating that capital adequacy, supervision and inspection of the supervision
department and market discipline form the three pillars of risk management. However, the
crisis proved that risk management systems are marked by severe limitations.
A supervisory framework for the application of backtesting in conjunction with the internal
models approaches and the market risk capital requirements are needed. The BCBS sup-
plemented an incremental risk capital charge with the VaR-based framework, obtaining the
default risk and migration risk, for unsecuritized credit products. It is worth mentioning that
after Basel III, the Committee changed the internal risk measurement model from VaR to ES.
2.2 The Innovation of Basel Regulation
A banking crisis is defined as “cases where there were runs or other substantial portfolio shifts,
collapses of financial firms or massive government intervention. Extensive unsoundness
short of crisis is termed significant”(Calomiris, 2009). One possible reason behind bank
crisis might be the banking sector’s inherent fragility.
Calomiris (2009) summarised some possible causes behind the occurrence of a banking crisis.
First, it can be caused if the increase in asset price turns out to be unstable. Furthermore,
credit booms can lead to the creation of a debt burden for the bank. Moreover, marginal
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loans create systemic risk as well. And lastly, a bank crisis may be caused by the failure of
regulation and supervision to keep pace with financial innovation.
As for the reasons provided, especially the last one, it appeared necessary to establish a formal
department to supervise market standards. The Basel Committee was established in 1974
by the central bank Governors of the Group of Ten countries and has presently expanded its
members to 45 countries. The aim to set up the Basel Committee was to enhance the stability
of the financial market via the standardisation and escalation of the global regulation for
banking supervision. It was serving as a forum which allows the cooperation between member
countries. A series of international regulations have been published by the Committee to
standardise banking systems, most remarkable is the publications of the accords concerning
capital adequacy referred to as Basel I, Basel II, and Basel III.
2.2.1 Basel I: The Basel Capital Accord
With the opening up of capital flow, capital adequacy became a crucial factor in banking
supervision. The debt crisis in the early 1980s in Latin America intensified the Committee’s
concern that with the increasing global risks, the capital ratios of leading international banks
could be deteriorating.
According to the comments on a advisory paper which was published in December 1987,
a capital measurement system was approved by the G10 Governors as the Basel Capital
Accord and it was released to banks in July 1988.
10 Background
In this Accord, a base proportion of money was required to perform the possible weighted
resources of 8% before the end of 1992. The structure was presented in member nations as
well as in practically all countries with active global banks.
Constant planning was done for the Accord’s development. It was rectified in November
1991 to all characterise with more unequivocal agreements that the general arrangements or
credit savings could be included in the capital sufficiency computation. The BCBS issued
another modification in April 1995 which perceives the effect of the two-side mesh of bank’s
credit exposures. Moreover, the 1995 amendment also extend the network of additional
factors. In April 1996, some documents were issued to explain the way in which how the
Committee members admit the influence of multilateral netting.
2.2.2 Basel II: The New Capital Framework
The Committee issued a subject for another capital sufficiency structure to replace the 1988
Accord in June 1999. This proposal facilitated the release of a revised capital framework in
June 2004. Commonly referred to "Basel II", the revised structure comprised three pillars
(BCBS, 2004):
1. minimum capital requirements, which sought to develop and expand the standardised
rules proposed in the 1988 Accord;
2. supervisory survey of an institution’s capital adequacy and interior evaluation process;
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3. effective utilisation of disclosure as a lever to reinforce market discipline and support
sound banking practices.
The committee improves the capital adequacy requirement by increasing the core tier 1
capital adequacy ratio and minimum requirements. Capital requirement is the measure of
wealth that an organisation, usually those in financial services, require to ensure that the
company remains solvent in view of its risk profile. It constitutes the estimation of capital
that the firm should possess to arrange support for any risks that it takes; it is measured
through the internal model. The revised framework which was issued in June 2004, the
Basel Committee concentrates on the development of capital requirement after the original
version. The updated structure was intended to strengthen the regulatory capital requirement
which could help to meet the financial innovation and challenge during recent years. Those
changes target rewarding and encouraging continuous improvement in risk measurement and
management.
2.2.3 Basel III: Post-Crisis Regulatory Reforms
Basel III was designed in response to the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The banking system
suffered the financial crisis with an excessive and considerable amount of leverage and
inadequate liquidity buffers. These deficiencies brought the banks unsufficient administration,
risk management as well as motivation structures. The Group of Governors and Heads of
Supervision (GHOS) reported higher global minimum capital requirement for commercial
banks in September 2010, which followed an assertion agreed to in July with regard to the
general outline of the changes in capital and liquidity requirements which is now referred to
12 Background
as "Basel III" (BCBS, 2010). The new capital standards were accepted in the G20 Leaders’
Summit in November 2010 and subsequently consensus on it was gained at the December
2010 Basel Committee meeting.
In the Basel III, the reform packages are listed as follows (BCBS, 2010):
• an additional layer of common equity - the capital conservation buffer that when
breached, restricts payouts to facilitate satisfying the minimum common equity re-
quirement;
• a countercyclical capital buffer, which places restrictions on participation by banks in
system-wide credit booms with the aim to reduce their losses in credit busts;
• a leverage ratio, - a minimum amount of loss-absorbing capital relative to a bank’s
total assets and off-balance sheet exposures regardless of risk weightage;
• liquidity requirements, - a minimum liquidity ratio, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(LCR), intended to provide sufficient cash to cover funding requirements over a 30-day
period; and a longer-term ratio, the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), aimed to address
maturity discrepancies over the entire balance sheet;
• additional proposals for systemically important banks, including requirements for
supplementary capital, augmented contingent capital and strengthened arrangements
for cross-border supervision and resolution.
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The strengthened definition of capital was phased in over five years. The committee raises the
capital requirement for risk exposure on asset securitisation. Meanwhile, the risk measure-
ment requires to be increased, especially under stress. The Basel Committee improves risk
capital requirements of trading business such as the over-the-counter derivatives trading and
securities financing business of counterparty. Whether they are under the standard method or
the internal rating method, risk weightings of securitisation risk exposure have been increased
in comparison to the original standard. The Basel Committee recommended that the asset
securitisation risk exposure should be calculated according to the accounting standards.
Moreover, credit risk introduced the concept of "exposure limitation", which fortified the
supervision of securitised debt for securitisation through higher capital requirements.

Chapter 3
Theoretical Comparison of Risk
Measures
3.1 Introduction
Risk management represents a crucial capability of financial organisations such as banks,
insurance agencies, among others, and thus, the accuracy of risk assessment is essential to
the process. Risk can be estimated with regard to probability distributions of possible losses
and confidence level of an organisation. Whereas, it is sometimes beneficial to express risk
with one number that can be interpreted as a capital amount.
VaR is presently the most popularly accepted and widely employed risk assessment method;
it also serves as a formal indicator to calculate the capital requirement for banks in Basel
I and II Accords. However, the recent reformation introduced in the Basel III Accord is
16 Theoretical Comparison of Risk Measures
now altering the financial market. According to some significant deficiency of VaR, the
Accord requires banks to communicate daily risk forecasts by applying a new internal model
approach "Expected Shortfall" rather than the traditional model - "VaR". However, ES does
not present a perfect risk measure either. Therefore, investors are uncertain as to which of
the two is a superior risk measurement and whether the reformation have a positive impact
on the financial market.
In this chapter, I will attempt a theoretical comparison of VaR and ES, considering their
definitions, mathematical properties, backtesting ability, ability to capture tail risks as well as
other relevant characteristics.
3.2 Literature Review
Some research works have offered significant comparisons of VaR and ES during the last
few years.
Yamai and Yoshiba (2005) compared VaR and ES in a particular case. They concluded that
because VaR disregards any loss beyond its level, it could cause a severe problem when the
tail risk occurs since incorrect information from VaR measurement could mislead investors.
Further, ES presents a better risk assessment method since it yields more accurate estimation,
especially under the situation of tail risk, and it could serve more aptly in its place. They also
demonstrated that ES requires a larger sample size as compared to VaR to attain the same
level of accuracy.
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Harmantzis et al. (2006) empirically tested the performance of VaR and ES using models
with heavy tails in returns. In the evaluation of VaR measurement, they found that models
that can capture rare events tend to estimate risk more accurately as compared to models
without fat tails, while for ES measurement, both historical model and fat-tail models can
produce precise results.
VaR works as a quantile measure which can provide investors an incorrect sense of security
without excessive nonlinearity in the payoff structure, while ES can examine more realistically
rare risks in relation to considerable losses (Wong and Copeland, 2008). These researchers
applied a portfolio with different derivative assets and employed the saddlepoint technique
to backtest ES. Based on the results, they concluded that ES contributes more than VaR,
especially in the case of the tail risk, while VaR was consistent in prediction only if the
underlying return distribution was well behaved. Moreover, they applied a power function to
precisely measure the critical value of ES statistic.
It is commonly known that the backtest of ES is difficult to achieve since it relies on
asymptotic test statistics for large samples. Wong (2010) introduced the saddlepoint technique
to backtest the trading risk of commercial banks using ES. The Monte Carlo Simulation
(MCS) results revealed the asymptotic method to be highly accurate and robust even with
small sample sizes.
Emmer et al. (2015) retrospectively studied the risk measurements with regard to the desirable
properties and their impact on capital allocation. They drew some conclusions that VaR
could be more robust in contrast to ES since it does not cover tail risks. Furthermore, ES
satisfies subadditivity and is sensitive to capture tail risk, while ES has been found to be not
elicitable and less straightforward to backtest as compared to VaR.
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Righi and Ceretta (2015) employed an unconditional, conditional and quantile regression-
based model to assess the performance of models by applying the ES backtest and an
interspersion truncated through VaR. A MCS indicated that the test is powerful. Meanwhile,
VaR estimation was found to be essential for ES measurement with regard to the models that
yielded the incorrect violation rates and also presented low p-values for the ES backtests.
It is common knowledge that the BCBS recently published fundamental changes in the
regulatory capital requirement of financial organisations. The VaR measurement has been
replaced by ES, increasing the capital requirement for heavy tailed risks (Kellner and Rösch,
2016). They empirically tested the risk assessment using daily log-returns for three indices
and two exchange rates during January 2001 and January 2015. The result indicated that a
higher potential exists for regulatory arbitrage when the ES approach is employed. Moreover,
ES is more sensitive to parameter specifications than the VaR method.
3.3 Value-at-Risk
3.3.1 History and Definition of VaR
Since the volatility of financial assets’ prices cause financial risks, the focus of risk measure-
ment is estimating the fluctuations in rates. A considerable number of empirical studies have
established that volatility comprises the following characteristics: fat tail, volatility clustering,
leverage effect, long memory and persistence and co-movement. Fama (1965) observed that
price changes did not tend to be independent over time and were rather characterised by
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tranquil and volatile periods, and the unconditional distributions of price changes were found
to be typically fat-tailed or leptokurtic.
Beder (1995) applied eight invariant VaR methods under three portfolios. Based on the
consequences, the study indicated that VaR depends heavily on the elements such as the input
parameters, assumption, data selection as well as the methodology. Risk managers were
surprised by those findings since the risk report can be modified under different assumptions.
The study then demonstrated that there is no universal method for the VaR calculation which
also illustrated that banks could achieve their purposes through various VaR estimation
methods. It concluded that VaR estimation does not provide specific outcomes but the
expected results based on certain assumptions.
Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) collected the sample returns for six large banks and checked
the accuracy of VaR estimation and forecasts during financial trading. The study initially
presented a comprehensive analysis of the efficiency of models applied by banks in practice.
Furthermore, Bao et al. (2006), considered five Asian countries that suffered the financial
crisis from 1997 to 1998. They applied different VaR models on the stock market and
revealed that it is more difficult to forecast the risk under crisis as compared to those gained
during periods of tranquillity. They demonstrated that most VaR models performed similarly
before and after the disaster but differently during the crisis.
As the most popular risk measurement method currently, VaR is defined to measure the
maximum loss of a financial institution or a portfolio at a certain period under a given
confidence level. For instance, if the confidence level α is 99%, then VaR is the loss that is
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likely to be exceeded only 1% of the time.
VaRα
(
X) = in f
{
m
m∈R
: Pr
(
L≤ m)≥ 1−α} (3.1)
where α is the confidence level, m is the largest loss and L is the portfolio loss.
3.3.2 Calculation of VaR
The value of VaR can be calculated from different situations. We apply a parameter estimation
under a known probability distribution whereas directly introduced quantile to determine the
VaR value under an unknown distribution. According to this, VaR measurement model can be
divided into two categories: parametric and non-parametric model. In order to estimate the
VaR value, the parameter model assumes that portfolio yields obey a particular distribution,
such as RiskMetrics JP Morgan’s, GARCH models. The non-parameter model does not
require any assumptions regarding the distribution of portfolio yields. It performs analyses
and the simulation of existing historical data to estimate VaR value, for instance, Historical
Simulation and Monte Carlo Simulation method.
Table 3.1 summaries the classification of VaR calculation approaches according to the
probability of distribution.
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Table 3.1 VaR classification
Parametric Non-Parametric
i.i.d. Variance-Covariance(VC) Historical
Simulation
Time RiskMetrics Monte Carlo
Dependence Method Simulation
&
GARCH
Parametric Method
1. The Variance - Covariance Method
The variance-covariance method is the most commonly employed method at the cur-
rent financial market which utilises the historical data of asset returns to estimate the
standard deviation and correlation coefficient of assets. This method determines the
appropriate value of VaR through the standard deviation of the portfolio based on this
variance and covariance under certain distribution assumptions.
The variance-covariance method is easy to execute because it only requires the assets
market price which concerns the latest situation. Another advantage is it can measure
almost all kinds of financial risks, especially bank credit risk and operational risk.
Based on whether the financial risks are well quantified, this method can also be
employed for performance assessment. However, it does entail certain shortcomings.
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This approach can mainly be applied to direct investment since it only reflects the
influence of the first-order linear combination of risk factors for the entire value of the
investment, which does not consider the non-linear relationship.
2. RiskMetrics Method
JP Morgan proposed the RiskMetrics model in 1994 based on the Equally Weighted
Moving Average (EWMA) model, and he put higher weightages on recent data, which
reflected the dynamics of volatility and can also quickly reflect market shocks. After
the clashes take place, instability exponentially decays with heavyweight decrease. In
practice, the RiskMetrics system determines the λ value by minimising the root mean
squared error.
RMSE =
√
1
T
T
∑
t=1
(
r2t+1)−σ2t+ 1t (λ )
)
(3.2)
where σ2
t+ 1t
represents the unbiased estimated of r2t+1
3. GARCH Model
Since the GARCH model can adequately represent a financial time series, especially
the ability to solve tail risk. Compared to other approaches, it can produce a better
estimation of VaR. This model typically includes two equations, the first one is from
the mean regression equation or condition, and the other is the conditional variance
equation. Thus, we can calculate the value of volatility within these two equations
through algebraic calculation. We begin with the simple GARCH (1,1) model, where
rt is the return of the portfolio, εt is the error term, µt represents the mean or expected
return. In this model, we can estimate the values by employing historical data or
randomly generated data to obtain parameters α ,β ,γ (Eq. 3.5) and simulate the model
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using the Monte Carlo method to forecast possible volatility in the future.
rt = µt + εt (3.3)
εt = σtet (3.4)
σ2t = α+βσ
2
t−1+ γε
2
t−1 (3.5)
Non-parametric Method
1. Historical Simulation
Under the assumption that the distribution of return is independently and identically
distributed, also the risk factors that can cause the volatility of future market are similar
to the historical risk factors. We can exploit the change in the actual sample to simulate
the rate of return on real assets in the future market. Subsequently, we can rank the
ratio sequentially and determine a specified confidence level corresponding to the
sub-site to estimate the VaR value.
2. Filtered Historical Simulation
Filtered Historical Simulation method extends the traditional HS method. Rather than
taking historical data, it generates a set of sample data through the mean or correlation
of the past returns.
3. Monte Carlo Simulation Method
The Monte Carlo and Historical Simulation methods are rather similar. The most
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significant difference is that the MCS method did not directly employ the historical
data to estimate the risk value, but used it to simulate the possible distribution of assets
returns by applying stochastic processes.
The MCS method represents one of the most effective ways to calculate VaR, which
can explain non-linear price risk, volatility risk and risks including those in the model.
Moreover, it can manage volatility, fat tail and extreme events. However, the dis-
advantage of The MCS method is that since the data sequence is generated by a
pseudo-random number, it can produce erroneous results. It also refers to large scale
computations, which rely on the selected stochastic model and reduce the efficiency of
simulation.
3.4 Expected Shortfall
The Basel Committee improved the banking supervision recommendations in 2016. It is
worthy to mention that the regulation shifts the quantitative risk metrics system from VaR
to ES. The BCBS noted that: “some weaknesses have been identified with using VaR for
determining regulatory capital requirements, including its inability to capture tail risk”(BCBS,
2013).
Expected Shortfall can also be termed as conditional VaR, another risk measurement tech-
nique that is commonly applied to reduce the possibility of a portfolio incurring enormous
losses. In a recent paper concerning risk assessment, ES was proved by several researchers
such as Yamai and Yoshiba (2005), Harmantzis et al. (2006) and Wong and Copeland (2008)
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as a more efficient way to capture the tail risk in the financial market. ES is considered an
alternative method since VaR can only measure financial risk with low or without tail risks.
If the confidence level is defined as α , ES measures the risk when VaR is breached. In other
words, ES represents an alternative approach to estimate the extreme losses that occur beyond
VaR under a specified confidence level.
ESα
(
X) =
1
α
∫ α
0
VaRµ
(
X)dµ (3.6)
ES inherits the properties of translation invariance, monotonicity, subadditivity and positive
homogeneity from VaR. Hence, ES is a coherent measure of risk. By definition, ES can
estimate all risks beyond VaR. Therefore the calculation of ES is based on the value of
VaR with regard to the probability of distribution. Under a normal distribution, given the
confidence level, ES and VaR are linearly related. Under t distribution, the higher the degree
of freedom, the higher is the tail risk.
3.5 The Mathematical Properties of Risk Measurements
3.5.1 Coherence and Related Properties
Artzner et al. (1999) stated that VaR does not represent a consistent measurement method,
and it can only measure percentiles of distributions and discards any losses beyond the
VaR level. Furthermore, Acerbi and Tasche (2002) discussed the coherence properties of
the ES as a financial risk measure. They indicated that ES can be applied to estimate any
potential source of risk. Artzner et al. also suggested that a useful risk measure should satisfy
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properties such as monotonicity, homogeneity, translation invariance and sub-additivity. The
first three conditions take consideration that in order to accept the risk, the risk measure
defines the amount of capital to be added to the assets while the last situation helps to reduce
the risk through facilities diversification.
VaR satisfies most of these conditions as described below except sub-additivity, while ES
represents a coherent measurement that could satisfy all the requirements.
Definition 3.5.1. Artzner et al. (1999) defines that a risk measurement is coherent if it could
satisfy all the following conditions 1:
• Monotonicity
X2 ≤ X1, impliesthat,ρ
(
X1)≤ ρ
(
X2) (3.7)
This implies that "if we know that the value of one portfolio will always be greater than that
of another portfolio, the portfolio with the higher guaranteed value will always present the
less risky alternative".
• Homogeneity
1all definitions follows the paper written by Artzner et al. (1999)
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The riak measure is homogeneous if for all loss variables X and λ ≥ 0 it holds that
ρ
(
λX) = λρ
(
X) f orall λ ≥ 0 (3.8)
In other words, doubling the capital implies doubling the risk.
• Translation Invariance
ρ
(
X + cR0) = ρ
(
X)− c (3.9)
This implies that "the possession of cash also reduces risk by the same amount. This follows
automatically from our definition of a risk measure as the buffer capital required to maintain
a certain level of risk. Having cash equal to the risk held in a portfolio c=ρ
(
x) signifies that
the total risk equals zero".
• Subadditivity
ρ
(
X1+X2)≤ ρ
(
X1)+ρ
(
X2) (3.10)
This property entails that "the risk value of two combined portfolios should never exceed the
sum of the risk of the two portfolios individually".
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• Convexity
ρ
(
λX1+
(
1−λ )X2)≤ λρ
(
X1)+
(
1−λ )ρX2 (3.11)
Essentially, this implies that "diversification and investment in different assets should never
increase the risk, but it leads to a reduction".
A risk measure can be considered as a coherent measure of risk as long as it could satisfy the
properties of translation invariance, monotonicity, positive homogeneity and sub-additivity.
Furthermore, the property convexity and positive homogeneity together imply sub-additivity.
In conclude, VaR is not a coherent measure of risk because it satisfies all the properties but
subadditive while ES could fulfill all these requirements.
3.5.2 Tail Risks
The definition of tail risk indicates that the distribution of returns is unnormalized, but skewed
with fatter tails. The fat tails suggest that there is a small probability that an investment
will exceed beyond normal VaR. It has been demonstrated by several studies that ES could
capture the tail risks better than VaR method. Yamai and Yoshiba (2005) compared VaR and
ES in a specific case and concluded that VaR disregards any loss beyond its level. Harmantzis
et al. (2006) examined the performance of VaR and ES using models with heavy tails in
returns. They found that ES performs better in fat-tail models. Furthermore, Wong and
Copeland (2008) concluded that ES contributes more than VaR especially in the case of tail
risks. Emmer et al. (2015) demonstrated that VaR could be more robust in contrast to ES
since it does not cover tail risks.
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3.5.3 Elicitability
Gneiting (2011) introduced the concept of elicitability in the backtesting of a risk measure-
ment. Elicitability entails a scientific property, fulfilled by some risk measures, that takes
into account the positioning of risk models’ performance. If a risk measure is elicitable at a
point, at that point, there exists a scoring function strictly consistent for the risk measure and
can be utilised for relative tests on models.
The comparison between VaR and ES demonstrated that ES is not elicitable under any
probability distribution while VaR is.
Definition 3.5.3.1. A scoring function is a function represented as follows
s: R×R→ [0,∞),
(x,y) → s(x,y)
where x and y represent the point forecasts and observations respectively.
Definition 3.5.3.2. (Acerbi and Szekely (2014)) A statistic Y is said to be elicitable if it solves
Y = argmin
y
E[S(y,X)] (3.12)
for some scoring function S(y,x)
Elicitability has been demonstrated as a valuable property for model determination, estimation
and forecasting simulation. These researchers also suggested that if the scoring function is
selected in advance, it could capture the optimal forecast point according to Bayes rule.
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Researchers have long debated the association between elicitability and backtestability, fu-
elled by the appropriation of ES for capital requirements’ estimation. The typical relationship
was put forward by Gneiting (2011) that the lack of elicitability may increase the difficulty
on backtesting. Altough questions have been posed with regard to the backtestability of
non-elicitable risk measures, later investigations affirmed the view that lack of elicitability
allows the evasion of strict backtesting, even though backtesting is generally possible for
non-elicitable risk measures such as ES when some specific conditions are fulfilled.
3.5.4 Backtestability
Backtesting constitutes a mechanism to evaluate the accuracy and effectiveness of risk
measures. The BCBS incorporates backtesting into the internal model approach to investigate
the minimum capital requirement. A risk measure’s ability to take a backtest is associated
with its eliciability. A backtest can be applied on VaR because it satisfies the property of
elicitability. Backtesting encompasses the comparison of the estimated VaR measure against
real gains or losses achieved on the portfolio or assets. Furthermore, a backtest is dependent
on the level of confidence assumed in the estimation.
The fact that the discovery of ES was not elicitable in the year 2011. Gneiting (2011)
determined that ES is hard to backtest. It is not elicitable signifies that no scoring function
can elicit ES. This shortness doomed the popularization and application of ES. However,
some studies suggested various approaches to backtest ES. Kerkhof and Melenberg (2004)
recommended a framework to backtest ES using the functional delta approach that depends
on large data samples to converge to the limiting distributions. They showed that tests for
ES with acceptable low levels yielded a better performance as compared to tests for VaR
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with realistic financial sample sizes. Wong (2010) proposed a mechanism, namely, the
saddle-point technique, to backtest the trading risk of commercial banks using ES. This
approach derives a small sample asymptotic distribution for ES statistic under standard
normal distributions. Moreover, Acerbi and Szekely (2014) proposed three non-parametric,
distribution independent ES backtest methods that did not require any asymptotic convergence
assumptions. In general, these studies have demonstrated that ES is not non-elicitable, but
the backtesting method is not as straight forward as VaR.
3.5.5 Robustness
Robustness represents another essential issue in the assessment of risk measures because risk
measurement is meaningless without this property. It is applied to identify risk measures’
estimation within the volatility of prices in the underlying assets. Developing a robust risk
measure is vital to banks or other financial institutions as they utilise various models and
distributions. On the contrary, the application of a risk measure without robustness could
lead to the influence of butterfly effect on the output data. From that point forward, small
mistakes in the classification of loss distribution could cause a significant impact on the risk
measure’s estimate. After the financial crisis, regulators started requiring robustness in the
internal models employed by financial institutions.
Definition3.5.5.1 presents the concept of robustness in mathematical terms.
Definition 3.5.5.1. (Cont et al. (2010)) A risk estimator ρˆ is robust at F if for any ε > 0 there
exists δ> 0 and n0 ≥ 1 such that
G ∈C,d(F,G)≤ δ ⇒ d(ρˆ(F), ρˆ(G))≤ ε,∀n ≥ n0, (3.13)
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where C is a fixed set of loss distributions and F ∈ C.
The intuitive notion of robustness has been expressed precisely in Definition 3.5.5.1. In this
definition, d(F,G)≤ δ describes that the distortion level of distribution is bounded in certain
radius δ , signifying that the variation is so small that the value from risk function will only
cause a small change, less than ε .
Cont et al. (2010) introduced another concept of robustness that considers the estimation
method. The robustness and sensitivity of the risk measures are examined and utilised as a
new foundation of estimation. The result indicated that sensitivity responds to the same risk
assessment model significantly. They also found contention between the subadditivity and
robustness of a risk measure.
3.6 Summary of Comparison
Table 3.2 presents an overall comparison of VaR and ES. It offers a summary of their
fundamental properties.
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Table 3.2 Comparison of risk measures
Property Value at Risk Expected Shortfall
Calculation ✓
Coherence ✓
Elicitability ✓
Backtestability ✓
Robustness ✓ ✓
Tail Risk Capture ✓
Stress Testing ✓
From the summary in the table, it is evident that neither VaR or ES represent perfect risk
measures from the point of view of a theoretical analysis, with both presenting advantages as
well as disadvantages.
3.6.1 Advantages of Value-at-Risk
As the most popular risk assessment model in recent years, VaR can precisely and efficiently
describe the size of the market risk. Furthermore, it is easy to understand for investors who
possess less professional knowledge.
Table 3.1 presents variant calculation methods for VaR. Regardless of the data used, there is
always a proper approach that can be determined to estimate VaR. Through the calculation
of VaR, financial risk can be forecasted in advance.
34 Theoretical Comparison of Risk Measures
Several researchers have discussed the relation between elicitability and backtestability
such as Gneiting (2011) and Emmer et al. (2015). Some of them indicate that a risk
measure can fulfill the property of backtestability as long as it is elicitable. VaR satisfies the
property of elicitability because we can obtain the smallest standard error by minimizing the
sourcing function. Moreover, VaR is easy to backtest, and the details of backtesting will be
demonstrated in the following chapter.
Additionally, VaR is a risk measure that contains robustness. It could be employed to estimate
not merely a single financial institution but multiple financial portfolio risks, feature that is
different from traditional risk measurement methods.
3.6.2 Problems of Value-at-Risk
Although VaR is utilised as a primary measurement tool for market risk in the current
financial system, its application entails considerable limitation. First, VaR does not represents
a coherent risk measure due to it is lack of subadditivity. The risks can not be diversified
in applying VaR to estimate the portfolio. The Basel Accord requires banks to set aside
capital in line with their level of credit, market, and operational risks. From that perspective,
an overestimation of market risk will lead to unnecessary utilisation of capital and reduced
profits.
Furthermore, although it is easy to backtest VaR, the failure rate is nonnegligible. The reason
behind this could be that the VaR method provides inadequate coverage of market risks when
the implied volatility is extremely high. In other words, VaR is criticised for its inability to
capture information in the lower tail beyond the percentile.
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Despite the disadvantages of capturing tail risk, VaR usually underestimates the market risks,
especially under conditions of market stress. Yamai et al. (2002) compared VaR and ES
under market stress. They indicated that under extreme value distribution, VaR can yield
misleading information. The fact that VaR cannot capture the tail risks beyond the quantile
renders it more robust than ES. Therefore, VaR is not an accurate risk measure under market
stress.
3.6.3 Problems of ES
The popularisation of ES faced some challenges due to some limitation of the method. ES,
by definition, is calculated based on the value of VaR. However, it is difficult to select an
approach to estimate ES when the distribution of data is unknown.
Furthermore, it is a common concern that ES entails difficulties in back-testing performing
capital calculation. Osband et al. (1985) initially introduced the concept of elicitability. In
general, an invariant risk measure takes a probability distribution and transforms it into a
single-valued point forecast. This implies that the risk measurement can be treated as evalu-
ating forecasting performance. VaR is elicitable because we can obtain a smallest standard
error by minimising the sourcing function. The widely contested solution to backtesting
difficulties is performing capital calculations using ES and then conduct backtesting using
VAR. More specifically, within ES, it is difficult to determine a scoring function such that
ES can be defined as the forecast input variable given a distribution output variable that
minimises the scoring function.
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3.6.4 Advantages of ES
ES inherits the properties of translation invariance, monotonicity, positive homogeneity and
subadditivity, hence ES comprises a coherent risk measure. It is important to note that neither
VaR nor ES can estimate the maximum loss especially during a financial crisis. Both methods
merely indicate a statistic assessment that is valid under normal market conditions. However,
ES’s ability to catch the tail risks is better as compared to VaR during high volatility. It means
that the estimation results using ES is close to the reality. In general, ES does a better job in
estimating market risks despite the hard backtesting shortness.
Acerbi and Szekely (2014) introduced three backtesting methods and prove that ES can be
back-tested. Those three approaches are all non-parametric, distribution-independent and
without any assumption on the asymptotic convergence. They indicated that the tests are
easy to implement and generally display better than the Basel backtesting for VaR.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have outlined a set of properties that are essential prerequisites for a good
risk measure. In general, ES has been described as a risk assessment method theoretically
superior to VaR in spite of some limitation presented by its estimation and backtesting, which
can be discreetly mitigated.
ES satisfies all the listed coherent properties, especially the sub-additivity that offers investors
an upper bound of combined risk. More specifically, lesser capital will be required in
3.7 Conclusion 37
proportion to the risk from regulators if ES is applied due to diversification. The overall risk
will be smaller in contrast to the sum of individual business and organisations could save the
capital for investment.
Furthermore, although neither VaR nor ES can forecast the maximum loss an organisation
can experience during a financial crisis, ES is more sensitive to the tail losses as compared
to VaR. More significantly, ES offers a more accurate and reliable estimation in unstable
financial market conditions.

Chapter 4
Empirical Comparison of Risk Measures
4.1 Introduction
Proper risk measurement and management are crucial for successful banking. In the banking
system, banks that are compliant with the Basel standards are required to set aside a certain
amount of capital to satisfy the capital adequacy requirement. Although some studies have
revealed that the Basel Framework imposes restrictions on banks’ development, the essence
of the rules is straightforward for the benefit of the financial market. The supervision requires
risk capital, which acts as a financial shock absorbers maintained by banks to prepare for
unexpected risks.
A considerable amount of money has now been invested in the financial market. There is
always uncertainty with regard to investors losing their investment. This uncertainty can
be identified, assessed and prioritised through enhanced risk management. Concerning the
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risk assessment, there are two approaches that can be employed to calculate risk capital; one
is the standard model, and the other one is the internal model(e.g. VaR, ES). The internal
model aims to identify the amount of capital requirement that must be arranged in advance to
ensure there is sufficient capital to cover the loss when risk is incurred. The BCBS evaluates
the internal model by backtesting the risk assessment.
The regulation of capital structure has become a crucial issue in banking systems post the
financial crisis in 2007. Banks reserve capital requirements to enhance the resilience of
the financial system. This measure reduces the probability of default and associated output
losses, and furthermore, diminishes the probability of a financial crisis. Several studies have
focused on the relationship between bank capital and risks.
Bliss and Kaufman (2002) demonstrated the way in which the constraint of monetary
policy is completed through capital as well as reserve requirements. They revealed the
compression of capital ratio can cause aggregate shocks on capital requirement and hence
impact macroeconomics. Therefore, the capital constraint should be introduced to explain
the procyclicality in bank balance sheets.
Alfon et al. (2004) presented the determinant elements for capital. They indicated the amount
of capital depends on risk management, market discipline and regulatory environment.
Through both quantitative and qualitative analyses, they proposed the outcomes that regula-
tory requirements impact the amount of capital possessed by banks and building societies,
using data from the UK.
Cuoco and Liu (2006) studied the performance of financial institution subject to capital
requirements based on a self-reported VaR measure. They paid attention to the problem,
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although the capital requirement based on the IMA can be effective in curbing portfolio risk
and inducing the revelation of risk, it can also lead to an increased probability of default or
extreme losses.
Adrian and Shin (2008) stated that monetary policy and financial stability are strongly
interlinked in a market-based financial framework. They maintained the view that short-term
interest rates are determinants of the cost of leverage and have been found to be important
in influencing the size of financial intermediary balance sheets. Moreover, banks effect
adjustments in their balance sheet to achieve a target leverage level. Afterwards, a negative
capital shock will contribute to a diminishing in credit supply and result in procyclical effects
of bank capital management.
Francis et al. (2009) examined the influence of bank capital requirements against credit
supply and indicated the way in which the regulator manage the capital requirement by
adjusting their lending and other asset components. They also suggested that higher capital
requirements may reduce banks’ optimal loan growth.
Alessandri and Drehmann (2010) indicated the significance of risk capital by generating a
framework to derive risk capital against credit supply and interest rate in the UK banking
system.
Hyun and Rhee (2011) applied a simple banking model to demonstrate that banks may prefer
to reduce loans rather than issuing new equity to raise the capital ratio at a time of economic
downturn if dependent shareholders are to benefit.
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014) advised that banks can improve their leverage ratio by adjusting
the capital structure and reducing real interest rates under a downward sloping loan demand.
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They also suggested that when the capital structure is fixed, the degree of leverage will have
a significant influence on bank risk.
Gambacorta and Karmakar (2016) highlighted the limitations of risk-sensitive bank capital.
Basel III regulatory framework introduces a leverage ratio that is independent of risk measure-
ments to estimate the minimum capital requirement.Consequently, the leverage ratio could
replace the risk-sensitive capital requirement properly because it imposes a strict restriction
during the financial boom period and a soft constraint in a bust.
Since the previous chapter provides a theoretical comparison of risk measures in relation to
various properties, this chapter will undertake the discussion from numerical perspective.
Additionally, in this chapter, I will consider the methods not only in terms of the estimated
VaR and ES values but also in terms of the distribution of bank capital. The Historical
Simulation and Filtered Historical Simulation approaches will be applied to simulate the
volatility model.
4.2 Risk Capital Requirement
Risk capital requirement (minimum capital requirement or capital adequacy) prescribes that
a certain amount of capital of banks ( or other financial organisations) should be reserved
for rare exigencies. Generally, banks use a capital adequacy ratio of equity to indicate the
risk capital, and the risk capital should be in the form of various risk-weighted assets. For
the banking system, the BCBS proposed a framework to estimate the minimum capital
requirements for market risk following the internal models-approach (IMA). Moreover, the
understanding of switching from VaR to ES under market stress has been revised in Basel III.
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The Accord indicates that the "use of ES will help to ensure a more prudent capture of tail
risk and capital adequacy during periods of significant financial market stress".
Regulators face the problem of determining appropriate minimum capital requirement that
could protect regulated banks against adverse market situations as well as prevent them
from suffering due to exceptional risks. Furthermore, regulators should leave the banks
adequate capital for their core business considering the need for the profitability of financial
institutions (Kellner and Rösch, 2016). If this is done, managers would be able to meet the
challenge of balancing the investment capital and risk capital requirement.
Figure 4.1 describes a platform overview that briefly explains the estimation of capital
requirement in accordance to the Basel Accord. This outline indicates both VaR and ES
methods based on historical data.
44 Empirical Comparison of Risk Measures
Fig. 4.1 Risk Capital Calculation
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The crucial ingredient in this process is the risk measure approach and multiplication factor
that are applied based on the outcomes of the backtesting procedure. The Basel Accord
dictates that each bank should fulfill a certain capital requirement on a daily basis, which is
expressed as the sum of (BCBS, 2013):
• "the higher of its previous day’s risk measure and an average of the daily risk measures
on each of the preceding 60 business days, multiplied by a multiplication factor";
• "the higher of its latest available stressed risk measure and an average of the stressed
risk measure calculated according to above the preceding 60 business days , multiplied
by a multiplication factor".
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As required, the multiplication factors range from 1.5 to 2 for ES and 3 to 4 for VaR, or set by
individual supervisory authorities based on bank’s performance of risk management system.
4.3 Backtesting
Backtesting presents a mechanism to evaluate the accuracy and effectiveness of the risk
measurements model. The BCBS incorporates backtesting into the internal models approach
to evaluate the market risk capital. The Committee believes that backtesting could provide
an opportunity to involve incentives into the internal model approach from the point of
consistency.
The framework of backtesting is developed by the Committee that offers a process for
all the banks to adopt the internal model to measure the market risks. Backtesting VaR
merely involves the comparison of the predicted losses calculated by VaR with the actual
damages that take place in the market at a particular time. If the actual losses exceed the
VaR values, it implies that, VaR underestimated the market risk. On the contrary, if actual
losses are less than VaR, this signifies that VaR effectively measured the market risk during
the time horizon. The number of uncovered trading losses is considered as the number of
exceptions in backtesting. In addition, VaR should be recalculated if the backtesting result is
not satisfactory.
The Committee directs that banks use the recent twelve months of data which is approximately
250 working days for backtesting. With regard to the number of exceptions (out of 250),
banks can be divided into three tiers: the green zone, the yellow zone and the red zone. Table
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4.1 and Table 4.2 describe the statistic limitations of the three zones regulated by the BCBS
for both VaR and ES.
Table 4.1 The Basel Value-at-Risk Penalty Zones
Zone Number of Exception Penalty Multiplier
Green 0 - 4 3
Yellow 5 3.4
6 3.5
7 3.65
8 3.75
9 3.85
Red 10 or more 4
Table 4.2 The Basel Expected Shortfall Penalty Zones
Zone Number of Exception Penalty Multiplier
Green 0 - 4 1.5
Yellow 5 1.70
6 1.76
7 1.83
8 1.88
9 1.92
Red 10 or more 2
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The green zone
The BCBS states that banks with 0-4 failures out of the 250-day backtesting period should be
placed in the green zone. In the green zone, the stability of test outcomes implies that the risk
assessment model is accurate and adequate to capture market risk. Such models that provide
99% confidence level can cover 99% of the 250 results. Since it would be probable for a
model that genuinely provides 99% coverage to produce 4 exceptions out of 250 outcomes,
the explanation for this backtesting result seems more reasonable. This opinion is enhanced
by the statistics in Table 4.1, which states that the acceptance of the backtesting consequences
in this range would result in a small likelihood of incorrectly receiving an inaccurate model.
The results of the backtesting reveal that when the number of exceptions is up to 4 out of the
250 sample data, the statistic multiplier of VaR should be 3, which comes down to 1.5 for ES.
The yellow zone
Banks with the exception numbers ranging from 5 to 9 are located in the yellow area. Results
in this area are plausible for both correct and incorrect models. The Committee states that
the exception number indicates the size of potential supervisory and the capital requirement.
The tables above indicates that the supervisor requires a multiplier from 3.4 to 3.85 for VaR
and 1.7 to 1.92 for ES, increasing with the number of exception. These guidelines help seek
a suitable structure of incentives applicable to the internal model approaches.
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The red zone
In the red zone, those banks are generally have 10 or more exceptions in backtesting. It is
intuitive to extrapolate that a problem exists with a bank’s model in this case. If a bank falls
into the red zone, the supervisor should increase the statistic multiplier to offset the potential
losses. Nevertheless, the supervisor should investigate the reason due to which the bank fell
into this zone. During the test period, 10 or more exceptions occur lead to an increase of the
multiplication factor to 4 for VaR and 2 for ES.
Penalty multiplier comparison
From Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 it can be observed that the multiplier varies from VaR to ES.
For VaR, it ranges from 3 to 4, depending on the area that banks are situated in. Whereas
ES takes a penalty multiplier ranging from 1.5 to 2. There are several reasons behind this
difference in penalty multipliers between VaR and ES.
1. Definition
The definition of VaR and ES determines that the value of ES will be usually greater
than that of VaR (see Figure 4.2).
VaR measures the maximum loss given a certain confidence level in a specified period.
If the confidence level is 99%, VaR expresses the value of the possible loss within the
99% possibility. For instance, 99% of 1000 is 10, weighting 100% to the 10th quantile;
it does not considering other more considerable losses. Therefore, we define the 10th
smallest rate of return as the value of VaR. ES can also be referred to as conditional
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VaR, another risk measurement technique that is usually utilised to reduce the pos-
sibility of a portfolio incurring enormous losses. Under this example, ES measures
the average loss when the 1% worst possibilities transpire. ES informs us about the
worst possible losses and how much they can amount. Furthermore, ES gives equal
weightage to all quantiles greater than the 10th quantile and zero weightage to all
quantiles below the 10th quantile. Thus the average value of the ten smallest rate of
returns is constituted by the ES.
Fig. 4.2 Probability density function of loss distribution
Figure 4.2 briefly explains the definition of VaR and ES. Y-axis describes the probability
distribution of the distribution of loss while the X-axis represents the rate of return
on assets. In Figure 4.2, VaR is defined as the quantile of the loss distribution under
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the confidence level, illustrated with a yellow line, while ES forms the average loss
when VaR is breached. Therefore, by definition, under the same risk level, ES always
exceeds VaR.
2. Tail risk
In a recent work about risk assessment, ES was proved by several researchers as a more
efficient way to capture tail risk in the financial market. Yamai et al. (2002) found that
VaR and ES can underestimate the risk of securities with fat-tailed properties and a high
potential for massive losses. Wong and Copeland (2008) tested a basket of the portfolio
within derivative assets. In other words, within high tail risk, the measurement results
demonstrated that ES can capture the tail risk that VaR fails to capture. They also
concluded that ES is more effective in the measurement of portfolios with tail risks as
compared to VaR in a crisis-prone world. Figure 4.3 provides an example of the way
in which ES can estimate risk beyond VaR (Hull, 2012).
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Fig. 4.3 Probability density functions of loss distributions that follow
(a) a normal distribution and (b) a distribution with extreme tail behavior
Figure 4.3 describes the probability density functions of loss distributions that follow
a normal distribution. It is evident that although both of them offer the same level of
VaR, the portfolio in figure (b) with high potential losses presents considerably greater
risk as compared to the portfolio in figure (a). Thus, ES is considered as an alternative
method since VaR can only measure financial risk that have low or no tail risks.
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3. Coherence
As introduced in the previous chapter, a coherent risk measurement should fulfill all
the properties: monotonicity, homogeneity, translation invariance, convexity and sub-
additivity. This property communicates the fact that the risk of a portfolio comprising
sub-portfolios will at its maximum be constituted by the sum of the individual risks
of the respective sub-portfolios. Sub-additivity is an additional essential property for
optimising portfolios. Portfolio diversification aims to reduce the risk under coherence,
while diversification can increase the value for measures that violate the notion.
Furthermore, the property of sub-additivity is important for risk capital requirements
in banking supervision. The capital requirement for individual branches depends on
its own risk. Moreover, the risk manager should be confident to the estimated risk
capital as long as the risk measure fulfils the condition of sub-additivity. However, it
may act against the original intention if the measurement method violates the property
of sub-additivity. VaR is not a coherent risk measure because it does not satisfy the
notion of sub-additivity. Therefore, in the Basel Accord, the basis of penalty multiplier
for VaR is set higher than ES.
4.4 Simulation Methods
There are three main approaches to measure market risk: IMA, stress test and sensitivity
analysis. The IMA, which involves VaR or ES, can predict the maximum loss within a certain
time frame and the confidence level. To estimate Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall,
several different methods, such as Historical Simulation and Monte Carlo Simulation can
be used. All these approaches depend on historical data and the consumption concerning
4.4 Simulation Methods 53
liquidity and the persistence of underlying markets. However, each methodology entails
some limitations for the process of risk analysis. Figure 4.4 presents a platform overview of
risk measurement and analysis approaches (Bohdalová, 2007).
Fig. 4.4 Risk Measurement Methods
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Estimation of VaR or ES usually requires a probability distribution of the changes in portfolio
value. The value of a portfolio depends on risk factors such as stock prices, exchange rate and
interest rate. Hence the estimation methods are constituted by the distribution of risk factors.
According to the underlying distribution, risk measurement approaches can be classified as
parametric and non-parametric technique:
1. Parametric
• Variance-covariance Method
• GARCH/EGARCH Method
2. Non-parametric
• Historical Simulation
• Filtered Historical Simulation
• Monte Carlo Simulation
To gain precise results, I collected the daily last prices for 25 most representative banks in
G7 countries from 1990 to 2016. Thus, the non-parametric techniques (HS and FHS) will be
applied due to the distribution of sample data is unclear.
Historical Simulation presents a process that allows constructing future market risk based
on previous asset returns of the market. Unlike other simulation approaches, HS is a non-
parametric method, signifying that there are no restrictions on both the distribution of data
and other parameters such as standard deviation. Under HS, it is assumed that the set of
future scenarios could be expressed through a historical window. Moreover, it offers the
advantage of providing a more accurate risk assessment with regard to the situation of "fat
tails".
4.5 Historical Simulation 55
Filtered Historical Simulation method extends the traditional HS method. FHS combines non-
linear econometric models and the historical returns to innovate the probability distribution of
possible returns in the future. In other words, it uses past returns as innovations in modeling
the randomness of the asset prices. Filtered Historical Simulation is a semi-parametric model
from the statistical perspective.
4.5 Historical Simulation
4.5.1 Definition
A contemporaneous description of HS was initially offered by Linsmeier et al. (1996). The
HS method makes a forecast concerning future market risk based on the assumption that
the past occurrences will be repeated in the future. For instance, if the risk factor is the
change in stock price, to emphasise the reliability of the consequence, I used the data from
25 representative banks from G7 countries for the period 1990 to 2016 regarding their market
values. The estimated window and backtesting window were both determined as 250 working
days according to the Basel Accords.
It was assumed that the distribution of the rate of return would equal to the distribution of
loss rate. Given the confidence level α as 99%, VaR would form the quantile of loss. It is
represented by the following equation (Artzner et al., 1999):
VaRα(X) = in f{x ∈ R : Fx(x)> α} (4.1)
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In Equation 4.1, X represents the rate of return, F(X) defines the cumulative distribution
function of X. VaRα(X) collects the maximum loss within 99% confidence level. More
specifically, 99% of 250 working days comprises approximately 3, it weights 100% to the
3rd quantile, and is not concerned about other more significant losses.
Different from VaR, ESmeasures the average loss when the 1% worst events take place. ES
informs us about the worst possible events and the associated amount of loss. Besides, ES
offers equal weight to all quantiles greater than the 3rd quantile and 0 weight to all quantiles
below the 3rd quantile. Thus, the average value of the three smallest rates of return is formed
by the ES (see Eq. 4.2).
ESα
(
X) =
1
α
∫ α
0
VaRµ
(
X)dµ (4.2)
4.5.2 Simulation Procedures
As introduced in the previous section, the risk measurement contribution is not accurate in
terms of the randomness of market change. In accordance with the Basel regulation regarding
the adequacy capital requirement, banks should arrange sufficient capital to meet the possible
loss. This risk capital is a formula based on the risk measurement and does not consider VaR
or ES and is also a multiplier that reflects the potential losses. In the Basel regulation, the
multipliers are defined as a certain number depending on the risk zone the bank is located in.
The higher the multiplier, the worse is the backtesting result. In my thesis, different from the
traditional backtesting method, I provide an alternative method to calculate the multiplier in
order to cover the entire losses.
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Multiplier
Since HS assumes that the past issues will repeat in the future, to offset the maximum
losses in the future implies ensuring that the risk capital can counteract the largest loss faced
during the previous estimation period. Thus, the calculation of the multiplier is based on one
assumption: the capital requirement can provide sufficient capital for any loss that occurs
during the backtesting period through ex post.
Suppose in HS, at day ’t-1’, we can forecast the possible VaRt for the following day ’t’.
Based on the assumption that we know the future scenarios of the market, the multiplier mst
represents a ratio of the real maximum loss over VaRt .
mst =
max(L)
VaRt
(4.3)
where, L represents the real loss (positive value) that took place during the whole estimation
window and VaRt represents the risk estimator (positive value) at time t calculated with HS.
This ratio essentially indicates the accuracy of the forecasting VaRt under the assumption
that the historical scenarios can represent the change in future stock price.
Similarly, the multiplier of Expected Shortfall can be expressed as:
mct =
max(L)
ESt
(4.4)
where, L is the real loss that took place during the estimation period and ESt represents the
risk estimator at time t calculated through HS.
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Capital Requirement
Both VaR and ES should be calculated on a daily basis to estimate regulatory capital. With
regard to the Basel Accord, a capital requirement is expressed as the higher of the previous
day’s aggregate capital charge for market risk or an average of the daily capital measures
in the preceding 60 business days. Whereas in this section, to clearly compare VaR and
ES in terms of the capital requirement, I calculate the sum of the total VaR and ES in unit
for the whole estimation period. Afterwards, the total risk capital requirement in Eq 4.5
and Eq 4.6 should be represented as the multiplication of the total risk measures in unit
and the maximum value of all multipliers that have been estimated previously. The risk
capital expressed in the two equations could cover the maximum loss during the estimation
window because the potential loss has been completely taken into consideration in line with
the multiplier.
CVaR = max(ms)×
k
∑
t=1
VaRt (4.5)
CES = max(mc)×
k
∑
t=1
ESt (4.6)
CVaR describes the capital requirement for VaR; and CES represents the capital requirement
for ES.
4.6 Filtered Historical Simulation 59
4.6 Filtered Historical Simulation
4.6.1 Definition
Although with Historical Simulation, the market risk could be easily estimated without
the need for assumptions regarding the distribution of risk factors, there are still some
nonnegligible disadvantages that should be considered during the measurement. First, one
precondition of the historical method is that the representation of the past can happen again
in the future. In order to achieve accurate results, an organisation should collect all possible
data concerning risk factors, a task that can be extremely difficult. Meanwhile, the historical
method could also lead to a large standard error if the sample size is small. Last but not the
least, the assumption itself could be wrong because history events can not replace the future
and the market is changing due to the updates in technology, regulatory change, inflation or
crisis and altered perceptions in the wake of scandals.
The Monte Carlo Simulation is another popular approach used till now. The critical difference
between HS and MCS is that HS uses real data changes in the market whereas MCS generates
random numbers based on the standard error.
Barone-Adesi et al. (1999) introduced the FHS that combines the volatility models(GARCH)
and the bootstrapping HS method. In other words, they combine the parametric way with the
nonparametric techniques. The basic idea is to estimate the GARCH model by considering a
set of previous returns. Subsequently, the historical asset returns could be standardised by
drawing the estimated standard deviation based on the same day’s value. This approach could
lead to a standardised sequence of historical rates of return without any assumption regarding
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their distribution. In this manner, the following day’s volatility can be produced at the end
of the sample. Risk managers can obtain numerical results by substituting past values of
historical standard returns rather than assuming a distribution of future returns. Considered
in this way, FHS appears to be superior not only in generating the corresponding number of
scenarios but also in taking into account the volatility changes over time. Moreover, it avoids
any form of assumption regarding the distribution of returns.
4.6.2 Volatility Model
Normally, an ARMA−GARCH(1,1) model is applied to measure the market risks of return:
rt = c+θrt−1+ εt (4.7)
The time-varying model ARMA(1) states that the returns of a portfolio are based on the
information of the last period’s market return and the information of the previous financial
period, where rt represents the market return, c is the constant,θ represents the AR(1) term,
and εt is the random residual.
The GARCH(1,1) model initially introduced by Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986) has been
presented below to depict the relationship between the current variance and actual sizes of
the previous time periods’ error terms.
εt = σtet , i.i.d. (4.8)
4.6 Filtered Historical Simulation 61
σ2t = ω+βσ
2
t−1+αε
2
t−1 (4.9)
where the volatility of market return εt could be conducted as a function of the conditional
variance σt and the independent identically distributed random variables et . etcould follow a
normal distribution or Student’s t- distribution, which depends on the data type.
However, within the GARCH(1,1) model, shocks may last only for one period and die out
gradually in the following periods. Therefore, the conditional variance could explode even if
the process is strictly stationary. Furthermore, coefficient restrictions imposed in GARCH
models are usually violated by the evaluated parameters that can hence limit the dynamics of
the conditional variance process. Moreover, GARCH model rules out the possible negative
correlation between rt and εt+1.
Nelson (1991) developed an alternative EGARCH model to overcome the limitation of the
GARCH model. It is derived to explain the leverage effect. The leverage effect empirically
states that the quantitative results of the rise and fall of financial asset returns have various im-
pact on future volatility in the form of the square. Hence it will affect the future asset returns
in the same way. However, it is necessary to abandon the square symmetric function in order
to explain the leverage effect efficiently. EGARCH model disposes off the historical data
through an asymmetric function to generate the value of future volatility. The EGARCH(1,1)
model can be expressed as follows:
log(σ2t ) = ω+αlog(σ
2
t−1)+g(et−1) (4.10)
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where,
g(et−1) = ψet−1+φ(| et−1 | −E(| et−1 |)) (4.11)
in the value of g(et) allows the sign and the magnitude of et to have separate effects on the
volatility.
4.6.3 Simulation Procedures
In this thesis, I utilise the daily last price of the most representative banks in G7 countries
from the period 1990 to 2017. These banks were selected based on the market values reported
in 2017. The FHS was applied to simulate the volatility in the ARMA model.
• Step 1.
According to the Basel regulations, risk assessment should be based on the previous
250 working days as well as backtesting. Thus, the VaR and ES are calculated starting
from 1991 based on the previous year’s data. Within the set of data, the system could
be solved by using maximum likelihood estimation, and thus, I obtain ωˆ , αˆ , ψˆ and φˆ .
• Step 2.
The starting value of the conditional variance σˆ21 should be set as the equilibrium
ωˆ
1−αˆ−ψˆ−φˆ . Additionally, et are modelled as a standardised Student’s t distribution to
compensate for the fat tails of daily returns.
• Step 3.
Within the estimated conditional variance, the standardised returns are calculated using
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the equation given below:
et =
εt
σt
(4.12)
• Step 4.
FHS bootstraps standardized residuals to generate paths of future asset returns. Hence,
I bootstrap et 1000 times in relation to the estimated standardise residuals.
• Step 5.
Within each bootstrapping of et , a new data set of asset return could be generate
through the AR-EGARCH system by setting up the initial value of r0 and σ0.
• Step 6.
This comprises the calculation VaR and ES using the new data set. As I bootstrap 1000
times, 1000 sets of asset returns could be generated. For each set of data, one VaR or
ES could be estimated, and the confidence level is 99%. I derive their mean through
the 1000 times estimation.
4.6.4 Backtesting
VaR backtesting
The backtesting in this section follows the Basel Accord presented in section 4.3. The BCBS
stipulates that banks should use the data of previous 250 working days to backtest VaR and
ES. The basic rationale behind backtesting is to compare the estimated VaR with actual data.
The value of the multiplier is determined on the basis of the number of failures according to
Table 4.1.
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ES backtesting
Since ES lacks eliciability, the backtesting of ES should be generated in virtue of VaR
estimation. I consider the methodology proposed by Acerbi and Szekely (2014) to backtest
ES without information regarding their distribution. The details of ES backtesting can be
found in Appendix A. Subsequently, I summarise the multiplier of ES with regard to its
number of failures on the basis of Table 4.2.
4.7 Results and Analysis
In this thesis, I employ data from the 25 most representative banks in G7 countries according
to their total assets in the financial market of 2017. The estimated window and the backtesting
window are both determined as 250 working days. The model is estimated using in-sample
data, and the risk measurement and backtesting is applied using overlapping data.
Table 3.4 displays the result of comparison of the risk capital calculated through VaR and ES
respectively. ’CVaR’ and ’CES’ represent the risk capital generated through the basic HS
method. ’RCVaR’ and ’RCES’ are estimated through the FHS method.
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Table 4.3 Comparison Results of Risk Capital Requirements
Country List
Country nanme Bank name CVaR CES RCVaR RCES
US(USD)
JPM 1234.100 841.957 962.842 686.009
BAC 1277.600 898.820 1748.270 933.720
WFC 1110.600 758.719 696.095 537.736
USB 1011.300 721.326 1088.960 686.655
CITI 1372.700 967.807 1018.340 796.265
BK 1173.300 811.911 1260.230 795.649
PNC 1126.700 784.516 1069.080 695.811
COF 1342.900 1018.600 1790.420 1003.640
UK(GBP)
HSBC 565.038 394.649 470.549 367.503
Barclays 1026.000 756.108 1303.385 783.015
RBS 609.9804 466.4363 1230.5 644.744
Lloyds 936.344 753.339 1049.350 703.991
France(EUR)
BNP 846.613 572.376 1017.020 565.314
ACA 746.339 493.599 929.365 488.688
Germany(EUR)
Deutsche 997.289 680.956 873.850 640.110
CBK 1117.500 766.949 1033.240 696.954
Italy(EUR)
UniCredit 1878.900 1666.200 1454.820 963.053
ISP 1195.000 794.621 1813.790 804.260
Canada(CAD)
RYCN 636.582 424.475 475.112 372.079
TDCN 672.590 445.586 495.670 381.274
BMOCN 656.061 427.513 620.525 408.751
CMCN 612.264 408.656 598.694 404.113
Japan(USD)
MTU 745.649 469.711 498.290 394.003
MFG 432.466 289.285 307.734 236.791
SMFG 438.924 291.858 343.922 273.008
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From Table 3.4 it can be observed that the total risk capital requirements vary between differ-
ent banks in G7 countries. It is evident that CVaR is generally higher than CES, regardless
of the bank considered, as well as RCVaR and RCES. In other words, VaR requires more
capital to offset possible extra losses. The reason behind these results could be analysed
along different directions.
1. Definition
VaR is defined as the loss level that can not be exceeded with a certain confidence level
during a specified period. By definition, ES constitutes the average losses when VaR is
breached. Thus, ES should be higher than VaR since ES measures minor probability
issues beyond VaR. Furthermore, ES is a superior in capturing tail risks in the market
as compared to VaR as demonstrated in the previous section. Consequently, banks that
employ ES as a risk assessment could be more confident with their risk management
as it covers more losses than VaR.
2. Multipliers
A possible explanation for this distinction is the calculation of penalty multiplier. First
of all, according to the Basel Accord, the multipliers are differentially stated in VaR
and ES. Table 3.2 and 3.3 present the regulated multiplier according to the backtesting
consequences. The multiplier for VaR starts from 3 plus a plus factor that ranges from
0 to 1 depending on the backtesting results. Meanwhile, ES takes a multiplier only
from 1.5 to 2. The reason behind this result can also be analysed with regard to the
definition, properties and ability to capture tail risks, as I explained in section 3.3.
Additionally, the estimated multipliers using real historical data represent considerably
similar results as the regulated multipliers.
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3. Risk diversification
In addition, VaR is not a coherent risk measure because it does not satisfy the notion
of sub-additivity. Sub-additivity is necessary for capital adequacy requirements in
banking supervision at the point of diversification. More particular, diversification
could help to reduce the risks if the measure meets the property of sub-additivity.
While for measures such as VaR, diversification may lead to an increase in their value
even when mutually exclusive events trigger partial risks.
4.8 Conclusion
The importance of VaR cannot be underestimated as it has been extensively applied in
risk management. In the last few decades, VaR has become one of the most popular risk
measurement tools in the financial market. However, ES can describe market risk better than
VaR, especially under distribution with heavy tails. The only reason that ES lacks popularity
is that it is difficult to backtest.
In this chapter I simulate the risk capital of VaR and ES using Historical Simulation and
Filtered Historical Simulation. Both methods produce similar conclusions that ES could save
the utilization of bank capital, an advantage created mainly by the definition, properties and
backtesting outcomes. Banks using ES could help diversify the market risks and save the
total risk capital through the property of sub-additivity. Moreover, the multipliers that follow
the Basel Accord vary in different risk measures. The result reveals that the multiplier for
VaR (ms) is higher than that for ES (mc). Furthermore, the backtesting results illustrate that
ES is more efficient in evaluating the market risk in practice.
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Consequently, the shift in risk assessment model from VaR to ES can help banks save the
risk capital and rearrange the distribution of capital by increasing credit supply.
Chapter 5
Global VAR Model
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, it was proved that the application of Expected Shortfall as a risk
assessment tool could facilitate saving capital for banks through Historical Simulation and
Filtered Historical Simulation. However, the results could only determine that ES is relatively
better than VaR for those banks. In other words, the research only focuses on the financial
market in the last chapter. In this chapter, the whole economic system will be considered;
macro-economy and financial sector should both be involved in this study to support the
research aim.
In the formulation of macroeconomic policy, the regulators should take into account the
interrelations across markets and countries. Increasing interdependencies between market
actors can be caused through global shocks or specific sectoral shocks whose effects are
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transmitted through various channels. Thus, a relatively comprehensive framework is required
to determine the importance of such a specific source in the worldwide economy. Since a
proper risk measurement is essential for the banking system, it is worthy to test the various
risk assessment models and the ways in which they could affect the entire economy. In
the existing literature, researchers studied the comparison of different risk measurement in
theoretical and numerical terms, but only rarely papers combined this analysis for various
sectors in the economy. Therefore, in this chapter, I will apply a Global Vector Autoregressive
(GVAR) model to simulate the relationship and explain how the economic capital change
propagates in the economy.
A Global Vector Autoregressive model represents a comprehensive system that is generated
based on individual VAR equations. Through a general, practical and worldwide system it
directs a quantitative examination of the relative significance of various shocks and channels
of transmission components. The GVAR model comprises the vector auto-regression model
for individual countries, in which the native variables are linked to foreign elements that have
been constructed through the channels of international trade, financial or monetary policy.
Moreover, each VAR model is linked consistently, and then the specific GVAR model is
estimated in relation to the global economy.
The GVAR model was initially proposed by Pesaran et al. (2004) to determine the interre-
lationship between national and international factors. They indicated that considering the
increasing interdependencies between markets and countries, it is necessary to model the
complex high-dimensional system on the global economy in conducting macro-economic
policy analysis and risk management. Furthermore, the GVAR model incorporates both the
macro section as well as the financial institutions. This paper established the theoretical
foundation for the GVAR model.
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Dees et al. (2007) asserted that the crux in setting the GVAR model is to systematically
clarify the country-specific variables from foreign countries to individual nations to deal with
common factor dependencies that exist in the world economy. They associated the domestic
variables within the country-specific foreign variables in the vector error-correcting models.
Furthermore, Cologni and Manera (2008) studied the influence of oil price shock on output
and prices based on a structural cointegrated VAR model. Moreover, the effect of monetary
policies on oil prices has also been studied within this model. GVAR model could also be
employed to forecast economic and financial variables (Pesaran et al., 2009).
Chudik and Fratzscher (2011) made an analysis and comparison of the limited liquidity
circumstances and the collapse of risk preference in the global transmission of the financial
crisis. Through the application of a GVAR model, they attempted to manage the identification
of the high dimensionality of the empirical analysis and thus concluded that although the
liquidity shocks affect advanced economies, the risk preference shock is crucial for emerging
economies.
Gross and Kok (2013) also applied a GVAR model to simulate systemic risk shocks and
measure the spill-over potential among sovereigns and banks.
Chudik and Pesaran (2016) summarised the literature and indicated the possible areas of
future research. Their study also offered a detailed theoretical description of the GVAR model.
The European Central Bank issued a working paper that studies the impact of bank capital on
economic activity based on a Mixed-Cross-Section Global VAR model(Gross et al., 2016).
They appllied a mixed cross section structural VAR model that ultilises countries, banks and
central banks. This cointegration system combined the macroeconomic and financial sector
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by utilising a weighted parameter within each variable. My research would follow the GVAR
model and the shock identification technique based on this working paper.
There are several reasons to support the selection of the GVAR model. First, individual indus-
tries in the economy are interlinked in a complicated way, especially the financial market and
the macroeconomic elements. Economic capital is a crucial mechanism in the management
of market risk, capital structure as well as the daily financial management. Hence an adequate
risk assessment model could contribute to the economic activities. Nevertheless, the world
economy is now combined; global trading, technological development, labour and capital
movement all across from interactions between countries. It is probably a challenge to make
a scenario analysis that combines individual economies with a simple model. This model
allows long-run relationships consistent with the theory and short-run relationships that
are consistent with the data. Lastly, the GVAR model affords an efficient mechanism to
model the global economy within high dimensions. It provides a coherent, theory-consistent
solution to the difficulty of dimensionality in global economic modelling. This thesis mainly
focuses on how the change in economic capital affects the macro-economy and determine
the risk measurement method that could lead to higher utility.
5.2 Model and Solution
5.2.1 Model Structure
The GVAR model in this thesis is based on the MCS-GVAR model presented by Gross
et al. (2016) that comprises three within and cross-sections. The basic notion is utilising the
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weighted average as a mechanism to calculate the weight of data within and across sections.
For the countries cross-section, Group of Seven(G7) countries1 where i=1...7 are considered
in this model. In the financial institution cross-section, j=1...28 banks of the G7 countries
rank among the world top 100 are selected according to their total assets. The central bank
cross section contains l=1...7 central banks from G7 nations.
The system contains the following sections:
• Countries cross-section:
xit = ai+
P0
∑
p0=1
Θi,p0xi,t−p0 +
P1
∑
p1=0
Φi,0,p1yi,t−p1 +
P2
∑
p2=0
Φi,1,p2zi,t−p2
+
P3
∑
p3=0
Λi,0,p3x
∗,C−C
i,t−p3 +
P4
∑
p4=0
Λi,1,p4y
∗,C−B
i,t−p4 +
P5
∑
p5=0
Λi,2,p5z
∗,C−CB
i,t−p5 + εit
(5.1)
• Banks cross-section:
y jt = b j +
Q0
∑
q0=0
ϒ j,q0y j,t−q0 +
Q1
∑
q1=0
Π j,0,q1x j,t−q1 +
Q2
∑
q2=0
Π j,1,q2z j,t−q2
Q3
∑
q3=0
Ξ j,0,q3x
∗,B−C
j,t−q3 +
Q4
∑
q4=0
Ξ j,1,q4y
∗,B−B
j,t−q4 +
Q5
∑
q5=0
Ξ j,2,q5z
∗,B−CB
j,t−q5 +ω jt
(5.2)
• Central banks cross-section:
zlt = cl +
R0
∑
r0=1
∆l,r0zl,t−r0 +
R1
∑
r1=0
Γl,0,r1xl,t−r1 +
R2
∑
r2=0
Γl,1,r2yl,t−r2
R3
∑
r3=0
Φl,0,r3x
∗,CB−C
l,t−r3 +
R4
∑
r4=0
Φl,1,r4y
∗,CB−B
l,t−r4 +
R5
∑
r5=0
Φl,2,r5z
∗,CB−CB
l,t−r5 + τlt
(5.3)
1G7 is a group which consist United States of America, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Canada
and Japan. The G7 is a consultation for dialogue at the highest level attended by the leaders of the world’s most
important industrially advanced democracies.
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In the countries cross-section, the endogenous variable xit forms the macroeconomic variables
such as GDP and housing price index that can describe the state of the country’s economy.
For the banks cross-section, y jt represent the financial variable collected in the balance sheet
such as total assets and leverage. The central banks cross-section define zlt as the endogenous
variable to depict the policy rate in each central banks. xit , y jt and zlt are stated with size
kxi× 1, kyj× 1 and kzl× 1 in this system. The intercept terms ai,b j,cl are defined as the sizes
kxi× 1, kyj× 1 and kzl× 1 respectively. PO, Q0, R0 represent the lag term for the section
endogenous variables. In this thesis, due to the complicated model structure and large size of
data, the lagged terms are all defined as 1 here. Θi, ϒ j,q0 , and ∆l constitute the parameters
for endogenous variables with the size of kxi × kxi , kyj× kyj and kzl × kzl . In this model, xt , yt , zt
are not only the endogenous variable for one specific sector but also exogenous variables
which could support other sectors. For example, the fluctuation of leverage for JP Morgan
and the federal fund rate could contribute to the US GDP. In other word, yt and zt affect xt
in the same country "i". Therefore, the endogenous variable in each equation could act as
the exogenous variable for the other equations. Similar to the endogenous variables, the lag
term P1, P2, Q1, Q2, R1, R2 are all collected as 1. The autoregressive terms of parameter
(Φi,0,0...Φi,0,P1) and (Φi,1,0...Φi,1,P2) are of size k
y
i × kyi and kzi × kzi .
Apart from the within-section variables, one important component is the across section
participant. An increasing trend of relativities cross countries and the financial market should
be taken into consideration by macroeconomic policymakers and people involved in risk
management. In the countries cross-section, the star variables x∗,C−Ci,t , y
∗,C−B
i,t and z
∗,C−CB
i,t
indicate the influences that foreign countries could exert on the native macro-economy
through different channels of transmission, where, ’C-C’,’C-B’ and ’C-CB’ distinguish
the effects between country to countries, banks to countries and central banks to countries.
The coefficient matrix(Λi,0,p3 , Λi,1,p4 , Λi,2,p5) is of size k
x
i × k∗xi , kxi × k∗yi and kxi × k∗zi . The
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banks cross section involves star variables x∗,B−Cj,t , y
∗,B−B
j,t and z
∗,B−CB
j,t which represent the
effects that other countries could have on the native financial market. The superscript ’B-
C’,’B-B’ and ’B-CB’ demonstrate the influence caused by other countries, banks and central
banks. The parameters matrix (Ξ j,0,q3 , Ξ j,1,q4 , Ξ j,2,q5) are of size k
y
j × k∗xj , kyj × k∗yj and
kyj × k∗zj . In the central banks cross section, other counties, banks and central banks also
influence the native central bank. Star variables x∗,CB−Cj,t , y
∗,CB−B
j,t and z
∗,CB−CB
j,t depict that
other countries, banks and central banks could change the current situation of the native
central bank. The superscript ’CB-C’,’CB-B’ and ’CB-CB’ differentiate the effects from
countries to central bank, banks to central bank and other central banks to central bank
respectively.The parameters matrix (Ψl,0,r3 , Ψl,1,r4 and Ψl,2,r5) are of size k
z
l × k∗xl , kzl × k∗yl
and kzl × k∗zl .
The cross-section shock vectors εit , ω jt and τlt represent structural shocks with the size kxi×
1, kyj× 1 and kzl× 1.
5.2.2 Variable Selection
This paper employs 10 variables with data collected from G7 countries and demonstrate the
economic implications of different market risk measures. G7 is a group that include Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The reason I
select G7 group is because these countries currently form the seven largest economies in the
world that represent more than 58% of the national net wealth 2.
2National net wealth, also known as national net worth, is the total sum of the value of a nation’s assets
minus its liabilities.
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Table 5.1 Model Structure
Cross-Section Type Model variables
Countries Nominal GDP
GDP deflator
Residential property prices
Long-term interest rate
Banks Nominal loan volumes
Leverage
Interest income/assets(or loan interest rate)
Interest expense/Liabilities(or deposit rate)
Probabilities of default
Central banks Short-term policy rate
This table provides an overview of the model variable selection in three cross-section
types.
Cross-countries section
In the cross-countries section, economic activity is represented by the nominal GDP, GDP
deflator, residential property prices and long-term interest rate. It can be affected by bank
credit, bank lending rate, cost of funding and short-term interest rate. Furthermore, the
influence spreads through global trading channels with a decrease in the aggregate demand
for domestic market leading to lower imports abroad. This section links G7 countries by
setting the weight of each state with regard to their nominal GDP level.
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• Nominal GDP
Nominal GDP is the value of final goods and services that an economy produced under
a given period. It is modelled on quarter-to-quarter differences of the log level, which
is the GDP growth rate. Theoretically, GDP growth rate is the most crucial indicator
that assesses whether the economy is growing or declining and the rate at which it is
developing. Hence, regardless of who the economic agent is, the government or the
investors should consider the value of GDP growth during the formulation of policies
and decisions. Besides, the GVAR model entails a mixed section system involving
countries, banks and central banks. To examine how the changes in the financial market
affect the economy significantly, the outcome of GDP growth value is the first variable
that is considered.
• GDP deflator
The GDP deflator is an economic indicator which represents the inflation via transform-
ing the measurement of output at current prices into constant-dollar GDP. It is utilised
to deflate the effect of inflation from nominal GDP; it also represents the productivity of
the economy. In this thesis, GDP deflator is modelled on quarter-to-quarter differences
of the log level. Similar to nominal GDP, the GDP deflator represent the aggregate
economic activity and could be affected by loan volume from the banking sector. A
high credit level will result in a high GDP deflator that will also give rise to the bank’s
probability of default.
• Residential property prices
The housing market forms an important factor in the economy because it is closely
related to consumer spending and borrowing. An increase in housing prices can con-
tribute to householders’ wealth. As a result, it could promote consumption, and in turn,
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accelerate economic growth. This phenomenon is termed as the wealth effect. People
become more confident about spending and borrowing if they can sell the house case of
an emergency. Furthermore, the volatility of the housing market can affect the stability
of the financial market. Recent research shows that 47% of ownership is mortgaged
to become a landlord. The mortgage market will exert a further influence on the way
which the central bank makes monetary policy. Lastly, the housing market is related to
inflation as well. The housing price is modelled in quarter-to-quarter differences of the
log level.
• Long-term interest rate
The long-term interest rate is defined as the government bonds that are mature in 10
years and are determined by the price of government bonds in the financial market. The
long-term interest rate is crucial in business investment that acts as the major source
of economic growth. Low-interest rate encourages investment whereas high-interest
rates deter and limit it. Long-term interest rate and short-term interest rate are closely
related. Short-term interest rate is determined by the central banks whereas long-term
interest rate is determined by the price of long-term bonds. If the market believes
that short-term interest is higher than expected, the long-term interest rates decline
in relation to short-term interest rates and the yield curve flattens. This variable is
modelled on quarter-to-quarter differences of its natural level.
Cross-banks section
The cross-banks section include 27 banks from G7 group, the most representative banks
with regard to their total assets. The estimation and simulation are performed according to
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the aggregate banking system data for the G7 countries. Within this section, all variables
for each bank are calculated through the weighted aggregate data according to their market
capitalisations.
• Nominal loan volumes
Nominal credit at bank level is a key element that can affect both the financial market
and macro-economy. Gross et al. (2016) explained that the nominal credit at bank-level
is represented as a function of nominal GDP, inflation, bank lending rates as well as
bank leverage. Besides, loan volume can also affect house prices via the wealth effect
channel. Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) indicated that residential property prices are
sensitive to short-term rates. They also pointed out that the type of mortgage with
floating rate is more popular and acceptable in the housing market. In this way, housing
price values can affect the bank capital and finally contribute to the change in loan
interest rate through the wealth effect.
• Bank leverage
Leverage at bank level represents the percentage of debt contained in the capital struc-
ture of a bank. Debt is utilised to increase the production volume, the higher debt, the
larger leverage is. Meanwhile, it illustrates the profitability of a bank if it uses limited
capital. Leverage ratio is also an indicator of risk. Banks with high leverage ratio may
be beneficial in times of economic boom, while this leverage can lead to serious prob-
lems in cash flow when a recession happens. Bank leverage is an important variable
in this GVAR system due to the research aim. In the previous chapter, I proved that
switching the risk measurement model from VaR to ES could lead to reduced capital
requirement. This influence would be acted through the financial leverage channel.
In this thesis, the leverage ratio is defined as a function of bank credit, probability of
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default and is modelled in quarter-to-quarter differences of it’s natural level.
• Loan interest rate
Loan interest rate actually indicates the banking lending rate is defined as the fraction of
interest income and total assets. Gross et al. (2016) conclude that the banking lending
rate can be affected by GDP, house price, long-term interest rate, bank leverage, cost of
funding and short-term policy rates. I study the worldwide economy hence the interest
income and asset return may be driven by macroeconomic and financial conditions
of other countries in the global system. Furthermore, a higher interest rate signifies
that less projects can be founded as a result of lower bank credit and finally affect the
macroeconomic (Bernanke et al., 1991). This variable is modelled in quarter-to-quarter
differences of it’s natural level.
• Deposit rate
In this model, deposit rate is defined as the interest bank promises to pay when people
store their deposit in the bank. The bank deposit rate could be affected by variables
such as GDP, long-term interest rate, policy rate and bank leverage. Gross et al. (2016)
represented the deposit rate as the cost of funding. They defined the deposit rate using
the fraction of interest expense and liabilities. Babihuga and Spaltro (2014) considered
determinants of bank funding costs with regard to a set of international banks’ data.
They suggestted that increased capital buffer can potentially support banks’ lending
to the real economy by reducing bank funding costs. The cost of funding is literately
correlated across banks, which are essentially driven by leverage. The higher the
leverage, the lower the cost of funding. This variable is modelled in quarter-to-quarter
differences of it’s natural level.
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• Probability of default
This ratio describes the likelihood of a default that may occur during a certain time
period in a financial institution. More specifically, it offers an estimation that the
borrowers cannot make their debt obligations. Probability is an important indicator in
risk management since it is closely related to the expected loss. When the assessed
risk increases, the probability also increases. This variable is allowed to be a function
of macroeconomic information such as GDP growth rate, house price indices or
obligor specific information such as loan growth and leverage ratio based on the stress
condition. The Basel commitment states that a default can happen if it is unlikely
that the obligor will be able to repay their debt to the bank without sacrificing any
pledged collateral or the obligor is more than 90 days past due on a material credit
obligation.This variable is modelled in quarter-to-quarter differences of it’s natural
level.
Cross-central banks section
• Short-term policy rate
The short-term policy rate implies the interest that needs to be paid between financial
institutions when borrowing and is generally determined by domestic central banks.
For instance, the Federal Reserve Board’s Open Market Committee determine the
federal funds rate in the US. In addition, there is a direct connection between short-
term interest rate, long-term interest rate, inflation as well as GDP. A low short-term
interest rate conducts expansionary monetary policy and results in high inflation while
a high rate produces contractionary monetary policy that affects aggregate demand and
employment. In term of the GVAR model structure, each country can only have one
central bank. Thus, I consider the weights of the cross-central bank sector same as the
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cross-country sector for the central banks of each country. This variable is modelled
on quarter-to-quarter differences of its natural level.
In term of the complex model structure, this thesis allows one lag in both the exogenous
and endogenous variables. The model is estimated using the quarterly data from 1999Q1
to 2016Q4. Before estimation, I use the Unit Root Test to examine the stationary of each
variable. The test results which are shown in Appendix C indicate most variables are
stationary after modelled. Besides, the individual equations are estimated by the Ordinary
Least Squares method since the stability of data is confirmed. The estimated parameters are
summarised in Appendix D.
5.2.3 Global Solution of GVAR Model
The GVAR model presented contains time-contemporaneous relationships. Thus the system
needs to be understood before entering the simulation procedure.
For the bank section, the 28 banks from the G7 countries are classified by countries aggregate
banking system, as well as central banks. The reason I model in the group of the country
is due to the research aim. Although different banks may respond heterogeneously to
similarly sized shocks, the target of this chapter is to compare the consequence of switch
risk measurements. Estimating the model based on the banking system level could help
simulate the macroprudential capital buffer according to banking systems. Furthermore, it
better captures the diverse responses across countries. In addition, the size of time series data
varies between different banks, and sample data for 28 individual banks from G7 countries
cannot be considered entirely representative.
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Step 1: Rewrite the model according to countries
Since different nations now distinguish between the group of variables, the indicators rep-
resented for different banks(j) and central banks(l) should be replaced with the symbol of
countries(i). Besides, the period of lagged terms have been defined as 1, implying in the
time of serious regressions, the current value of variable depends on information from the
previous period.
Then the equation system can be re-written as follows:
• Countries cross-section:
xit = ai+Θi,1xi,t−1+Φi,0,0yi,t +Φi,0,1yi,t−1+Φi,1,0zi,t +Φi,1,1zi,t−1
+Λi,0,0x∗i,t +Λi,0,1x
∗
i,t−1+Λi,1,0y
∗
i,t +Λi,1,1y
∗
i,t−1+Λi,2,0z
∗
i,t +Λi,2,1z
∗
i,t−1+ εit
(5.4)
• Banks cross-section:
yit = bi+ϒi,1yi,t−1+Πi,0,0xi,t +Πi,0,1xi,t−1+Πi,1,0zi,t +Πi,1,1zi,t−1
+Ξi,0,0x∗i,t +Ξi,0,1x
∗
i,t−1+Ξi,1,0y
∗
i,t +Ξi,1,1y
∗
i,t−1+Ξi,2,0z
∗
i,t +Ξi,2,1z
∗
i,t−1+ωit
(5.5)
• Central banks cross-section:
zit = ci+∆i,1zi,t−1+Γi,0,0xi,t +Γi,0,1xi,t−1+Γi,1,0yi,t +Γi,1,1yi,t−1
+Ψi,0,0x∗i,t +Ψi,0,1x
∗
i,t−1+Ψi,1,0y
∗
i,t +Ψi,1,1y
∗
i,t1+Ψi,2,0z
∗
i,t +Ψi,2,1z
∗
i,t−1τit
(5.6)
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Step 2: Generate model in the form of matrices
Time-contemporaneous relationships exist between variables in this GVAR model. The
endogenous variables xt ,yt , zt and their lagged terms are all involved in every single equation.
Thus it is necessary to solve the system using the matrix form.
Reallocating the simultaneous equations, the following can be obtained:

I −Φi,0,0 −Φi,1,0
−Πi,0,0 I −Πi,1,0
−Γi,0,0 −Γi,1,0 I


xi,t
yi,t
zi,t
=

ai
bi
ci
+

Θi,1 Φi,0,1 Φi,1,1
Πi,0,1 ϒi,1 Πi,1,1
Γi,0,1 Γi,1,1 ∆i,1


xi,t−1
yi,t−1
zi,t−1

+

Λi,0,0 Λi,1,0 Λi,2,0
Ξi,0,0 Ξi,1,0 Ξi,2,0
Ψi,0,0 Ψi,1,0 Ψi,2,0


x∗i,t
y∗i,t
z∗i,t
+

Λi,0,1 Λi,1,1 Λi,2,1
Ξi,0,1 Ξi,1,1 Ξi,2,1
Ψi,0,1 Ψi,1,1 Ψi,2,1


x∗i,t−1
y∗i,t−1
z∗i,t−1
+

εit
ωit
τit

(5.7)
Step 3: Define parameter matrices
For the model provided above, I define each parameter to obtain a more straightforward
expression.
Q =

I −Φi,0,0 −Φi,1,0
−Πi,0,0 I −Πi,1,0
−Γi,0,0 −Γi,1,0 I
 (5.8)
G0 = Q−1

ai
bi
ci
 (5.9)
5.2 Model and Solution 85
G1 = Q−1

Θi,1 Φi,0,1 Φi,1,1
Πi,0,1 ϒi,1 Πi,1,1
Γi,0,1 Γi,1,1 ∆i,1
 (5.10)
G2 = Q−1

Λi,0,0 Λi,1,0 Λi,2,0
Ξi,0,0 Ξi,1,0 Ξi,2,0
Ψi,0,0 Ψi,1,0 Ψi,2,0
 (5.11)
G3 = Q−1

Λi,0,1 Λi,1,1 Λi,2,1
Ξi,0,1 Ξi,1,1 Ξi,2,1
Ψi,0,1 Ψi,1,1 Ψi,2,1
 (5.12)
Step 4: Define variable matrices
Subsequently, the variables could also be written in the matrix form:
si,t =

xi,t
yi,t
zi,t
 (5.13)
s∗i,t =

x∗i,t
y∗i,t
z∗i,t
 (5.14)
86 Global VAR Model
φi,t = Q−1

εit
ωit
τit
 (5.15)
Step 5: Global solution
The reduced form of the model can then be expressed as follows:
si,t = G0+G1si,t−1+G2s∗i,t +G3s
∗
i,t−1+φi,t (5.16)
The global system can now be applied for purpose of simulation and forecast. Additionally,
the weights vary according to the time as indicated by the definition,
5.3 Shock Identification
5.3.1 Shock Type Identification
In the discussion of capital or capital ratio, the term "leverage" has a strong presence. The
leverage ratio is one of the key indicators for financial institutions. It measures the amount
of capital generated from loans and its contribution to profits. Organisations depend on this
indicator not only because it provides a way to finance their operations on a mixture of equity
and debt but also set an alert on the amount of debt companies need to pay off and ensure it
falls within their capacity. Adrian and Shin (2010) found that marked-to-market leverage is
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strongly procyclical and leverage growth has a negatively correlation with total asset growth.
Adrian and Shin (2013) suggestted that leverage growth is negatively aligned with unit Value
at Risk growth for banks. Financial leverage can be defined in different ways, the ratio used
in this thesis is the equity multiplier which is expressed as a ratio of total assets and total
equity.
Leverage ratio is also closely related with risk as well as risk measures. By definition, the
leverage comprises a ratio of total assets and total equity. Figure 5.1 clearly explain two
modes to enhance leverage ratio (Adrian and Shin, 2013). Banks can increase their leverage
ratio either by improving credit supply or diminishing the amount of equity.
Fig. 5.1 Two modes of leveraging up
In mode 1, the firm maintains assets fixed but replaces equity with debt. In mode presented
on the right, the firm keeps equity fixed and increases the size of total assets.
In the last chapter, I have proved that switching from VaR to ES could bring a reduction on
the capital requirement through both Historical Simulation and Filtered Historical Simulation.
In this case, banks could reach higher leverage when using ES as the internal model via mode
2. Take an example of JP Morgan, and I collect data from 1999 to 2016, bank leverage and
risk measures 3 are positively correlated.
3 Here I take the absolute value of risk measures.
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Fig. 5.2 JP Morgan Leverage Correlation with Risk Capital
Figure 5.2 describe the correlation between risk capital and leverage ratio of JP Morgan
from 1999 to 2016 and "CVaR" and "CES" are the risk capital requirements for VaR and
ES respectively. It is noticeable that the leverage ratio is negatively related to risk capital.
Leverage will go up when there is a decrease in risk capital. Since ES could help to diminish
the risk capital requirement by better capturing the tail risks, using ES can improve the
leverage ratio for banks. Under such a case, the saved capital could be either invested as the
credit supply to increase the total asset or deduced from the equity. Thus, I can identify two
shocks through the assumptions.
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Credit Supply Shock
Under the assumption of constant capital, a reduction in the risk capital requirement implies
increased capital investment. Therefore, a positive credit supply shock can be issued. Banks
could achieve a higher leverage ratio by increasing their assets.
Capital Shock
Under the assumption of an unchangeable debt, a decrease of risk capital requirement consti-
tutes diminished capital. Again, it can lead to a higher leverage ratio. Thus, a negative capital
shock can be observed here.
However, when the minimum capital requirement declines due to a changing in the risk
assessment model, most companies would rather shift the capital buffer into investments
rather than cut down the capital to reduce risks.
5.3.2 Shock Size Calibration
Since the leverage ratio is conducted through risk capital requirement change when switching
from VaR to ES, each unit growth of leverage will decrease the risk capital by the value
of correlation. Meanwhile, VaR requires more capital to cover the risk than ES under
same leverage value. Therefore, the shock size should be calibrated using the difference of
90 Global VAR Model
correlation between risk capital requirement and leverage ratio. 4
∆= ψES×mc−ψVaR×ms (5.17)
where ∆ represents the shock size calibrated for the leverage shock. ψES is the correlation
between each bank’s leverage and ES, and ψVaR marks the correlation between each bank’s
leverage and VaR. Additionally, mc and ms constitute the penalty multipliers for ES and VaR
respectively according to the data for each bank. More specifically, ψES×mc represent the
correlation between leverage and the minimum capital requirement for ES while ψVaR×ms
demonstrate the correlation between leverage and risk capital requirement for VaR. In general,
the shock size indicates the extend to which the leverage ratio will change when VaR is
replaced with ES.
I collect data for the 28 banks which has been introduced before in G7 countries. Through
Eq. 5.17, I take shock size for each country as a weighted average of ∆ of individual banks
with regard to their total asset value. The shock sizes are calibrated in the table below:
Table 5.2 Shock Size Calibration
Countries US UK France Germany Italy Canada Japan
Shock Size 0.0391 0.0695 0.1059 0.1067 0.0335 0.0219 0.0676
One assertion that requires to be made here is that shock size evaluates the amount of risk
capital change, which could either be served to improve the credit supply or to deduce the
equity.
4For example, if the bank leverage increases by 1, CVaR will decrease by 0.293 while CES reduce by 0.236.
The difference between correlations (0.057) is the shock size.
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5.3.3 Sign Restriction
Sign restriction is applied to identify the structural shock in a GVAR model. This approach
was originally proposed by Faust (1998), Canova and De Nicolo (2002), and Uhlig (2005)
in the context of monetary policy applications. This method has been increasingly applied
to structural VAR identification in several studies subsquently. The sign restriction method
is different from the other identification approaches. In this identification technique, the
number of shocks does not requested to be equalised with the number of variables and the
sign of restrictions are imposed directly on the impulse responses.
Faust (1998) initially introduced a new approach to identify shocks in the SVAR model to
examine the measure of forecast error that can contribute to monetary policy shocks. In his
paper, he proposed that restrictions on shock identification could be estimated as both formal
restrictions, such as some linear restrictions and informal restrictions. Informal restrictions
in VAR identification assert that people hold preformed opinions regarding the economy’s
dynamic response to a particular shock. For instance,a supply shock could increase the
quantity and price of goods while a demand shock could decrease both. This research
imposed a minimal set of restrictions with regard to a monetary policy shock.
Canova and De Nicolo (2002) researched on the importance of monetary disturbances
for cyclical fluctuations in real activity and inflation by applying a macroeconomic model
populated by 5 types of agents: those from households, firms, financial intermediaries, fiscal
authority and monetary authorities. Similarly, they identified monetary shocks by describing
theoretical sign restrictions.
92 Global VAR Model
Uhlig (2005) further estimated the effects of monetary policy shocks on output by imposing
sign restrictions on the impulse response of prices. This approach is asymmetric as part
known sign restrictions on fiscal policy shock. More specifically, he assumed that people are
agnostic with regard to the response of output but not of certain other variables.
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) studied the impact of fiscal policy shocks using vector autore-
gressions. The sign restriction technique was also applied in this study to identify government
revenue and expenditure shocks.
Peersman and Straub (2009) tested the impact of various shocks such as technology shock,
labour supply shock, monetary policy shock and aggregate spending shock on hours worked
in the Euro area. The vector autoregressions and sign restriction were used in this research.
The results revealed a positive response of hours to technology shocks.
The outcomes from the last chapter demonstrate that the risk capital requirement differs from
VaR and ES. Therefore, a positive leverage shock will occur when banks switch their risk
assessment model from VaR to ES. In this thesis, I concentrate on the degree of the leverage
shock that can affect the macroeconomics using a GVAR model, hence the sign restriction is
imposed with regard to the following 10 variables: GDP, inflation, residential property price,
the long-term interest rate in the macroeconomic sector; loan volume, leverage, lending rate,
deposit rate and probability of default in the banking sector; policy rate in central bank level.
Since I have obtained the reduced GVAR model
si,t = G0+G1si,t−1+G2s∗i,t +G3s
∗
i,t−1+φi,t (5.18)
φi,t is a vector of structural shocks εit , ωit and τit
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φi,t = Q−1

εit
ωit
τit
= Q−1× ei,t5 (5.19)
Assume the structural shocks are uncorrelated, Ordinary least squares (OLS) approach can
be applied to estimate the system because only lagged values of endogenous variables appear
on the right-hand side. When all parameters are obtained, the variance of structural shock
can be calculated as:
Σφ = (Q−1ei,t)(Q−1ei,t)
′
= Q−1Q−1′
(5.20)
Assume P is a lower triangular matrix in the case of usual Cholesky decomposition that
satisfies P
′
= chol(Σφ ).
Σφ = P
′
P
= P
′
S
′
SP
= P¯
′
P¯
(5.21)
where S is an orthonormal matrix. The procedure continues in the following way. S is
randomly drawn using the QR decomposition, then the restriction matrix Q is computed
through the formula:
Q−1 = P¯
′
(5.22)
The following step would be computing the impulse responses and evaluating whether they
satisfy the restrictions imposed directly on the shape of the impulse responses. If the impulse
responses satisfy the given restrictions, then the impact matrix P is saved. If not, then delete
the impact matrix P.
Random drawing should be continued until N accepted draws are achieved. Then sort the
models by impulse response distance to the median according to the given sign restrictions.
5ei,t ∼ i.i.d
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Finally, choose the model which represents the median impulse responses. Matrix B which
represents the median impulse responses is defined as the one that produces responses to
the identified structural shocks. It should be observed that there does not exist a unique B.
Regarding our model, we have drawn randomly until we have identified 1000 impact matrices
and hence 1000 different SVAR models in the structural VAR identification procedure. The
sign restrictions that were used to sort the model and select the median one will be discussed
in the following section.
In our model, the sign restrictions on impulse responses have been illustrated in Table 5.3. I
consider two types of shocks in the GVAR model, a negative capital shock and the a positive
credit supply shock. In this thesis, both of these two shocks are in line with the leverage
shock. Gross et al. (2016) indicated that credit supply growth is combined with a negative
sign restriction on the loan interest rate. While Uhlig (2005) stated a contractionary monetary
policy should raise the federal funds rate. Mumtaz et al. (2015) proposed that increased
credit will lead to higher inflation and policy rate. Furthermore, an increased likelihood of
default negatively constrains GDP growth while liquidity has a significantly positive effect
on capital buffer (Stolz, 2007). Moreover, a decline in capital supply can lead to an increase
in credit supply, leverage ratio and the probability of default. In addition, Alessandri and
Drehmann (2010) found that higher risk capital levels impact the bank’s profit by lowering
the total interest payments on liabilities.
Table 5.3 Sign restriction on impulse responses
VARIABLES
SHOCK GDP IPD HPI LTIR LOAN LEV LIR DR POD STPR
Credit Supply (+) + + + - + +
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Relations between macroeconomic variables, such as GDP and housing price index, should
be left without any information restriction. In contrast to other identification approaches,
sign restriction brings several advantages to the model. One advantage of this method is
that the restriction is imposed through impulse responses rather than the identification of the
structural parameters. Furthermore, the evenness of structural impulse response functions
can be restricted by the covariance of prior responses. In addition, it is not necessary to apply
the Bayesian approach to estimate the model because sign restriction does not demand any
prior for the sign matrix Q.
5.4 Results and Discussion
Recalling the previous chapter, the risk assessment model can affect the capital buffer of
banks in the financial sector. This chapter aims to determine the way in which it contributes
to the entire economy. Hence, a sign-identified GVAR model is generated to simulate the
impulse response under a positive capital shock. Meanwhile, from 5.1 the leverage could
increase through the growth of credit supply. Thus the positive capital shock is imposed with
a positive leverage shock from the perspective of sign restriction technique. This system
offers the advantage of combining different departments and involves information restrictions
from the real world. The results of shock simulation will be presented for both impulse
response and forecasting scenario.
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5.4.1 Impulse Response
In economics, the term impulse response is applied to describe how the economy reacts
to various type of shocks during different market conditions. These shocks, caused by
exogenous factors, are modelled through contemporary economic systems. The form of
exogenous variables used for simulation in this study differ from those used in the estimation
procedure. GDP, GDP deflator, residential property price and loan volume are considered in
the log of their natural level. The leverage ratio, long-term interest rate, loan interest rate,
deposit rate, the probability of default and short-term policy rate are simulated in their natural
level.
GDP impulse response to leverage shock
The impulse response of GDP to a positive leverage shock of G7 countries have been collected
and presented in the figure below:
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Fig. 5.3 GDP impulse response from G7 countries
In general, these figures demonstrate a temporary increase on the impulse response function
of real GDP in response to positive capital shocks, especially in the US, the UK, France,
Germany and Canada. While the other countries, such as Italy and Japan show a slight
decline during the first few periods and then increase afterwards. Evidently, the shock drives
GDP to a higher level in all countries. The reason for this increase might be a spillover effect
transmitted through the channel of consumption. More specifically, a positive capital shock
will cause an increase in credit supply and encourage consumption.
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Inflation impulse response to leverage shock
Figure 5.4 offers the overall impulse response of GDP deflator against the leverage shock
in G7 countries. GDP deflator is an index that measures price inflation or deflation for a
specific country for a certain time. In the sign restriction, I have left the relation between
capital shock and IPD blank as no general trend that could be concluded from those impulse
response figures.
Fig. 5.4 IPD impulse response from G7 countries
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From the results, we can see that the US, France, Germany and Italy’s responses to the
capital shock are significantly positive although there was some fluctuation when the shock
began. This fluctuation is caused by the negative estimated parameter before IPD. However,
inflations in UK and Japan response negatively and decline to a lower steady-state when
aftershocks happen. Canada witnesses a slight decrease in capital shock due to inflation and
increasing afterwards. Rather like the similar trend in GDP response, various responses in
inflation might be caused due to different reasons. Generally, an increasing credit supply
encourages consumption, which can lead to an increase in inflation.
Residential property price impulse response to leverage shock
The figures bellow represent the impulse responses of capital shock on residential property
price in G7 countries.
Fig. 5.5 HPI impulse response from G7 countries
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A decrease in HPI occurs aftershocks in the US, the UK and Japan, this decrease takes the
steady state of HPI to a lower level in the long run. While the other countries show a general,
increasing trend of response after the shock happens despite some volatilities. From the
figure, it can be observed that most countries show increased responses to a positive leverage
shock on the housing price index. This is because greater credit supply will increase the
demand in the housing market, and finally drive the houses to increase.
Long-term interest rate impulse response to leverage shock
Figure 5.6 presents the response of long-term interest rate to the leverage shock. The
long-term interest rate, as defined in the variable structure, is the interest rate of 10-year
government bond. It is affected by capital shock as well.
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Fig. 5.6 LTIR impulse response from G7 countries
From the figures, it can be observed that countries such as the US, France, Germany and
Japan response positively against the leverage shock whereas a reduction can be seen for
countries like the UK, Italy and Canada.
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5.4.2 Implication from IRF
The impulse responses manifest the positive leverage shock will bring positive influences on
GDP for most countries in G7. This consequence further state that the shift from VaR to ES
could be conducive to economic development.
The BCBS has been revising their accords on market risk framework since 2012, and it is
expected to be implemented by 2018. The VaR will be retired by that time and ES will be
applied to calculate the market risk capital requirement as an internal model. My research
started before the BCBS changed their rule in 2016, but this behaviour virtually supports
my idea about VaR and ES. It is necessary to point out that neither VaR or ES can forecast
the actual maximum loss in the future market. However, by construction, ES will always be
more conservative than VaR. Therefore, the risk capital requirement for ES has regulated
smaller than which for VaR because of their potential losses. In addition, people will lose
information about the individual risk drivers and their possible effects when they assemble
results from a large number of risk factors via a simple measure.
The replacement of VaR by ES also reflects the fundamental change of risk management,
especially after the financial crisis. Banks used to aim for surviving in normal market
situations now tend to ensure survival in stressed market conditions by better capturing the
tail risks using ES. By far, VaR is still extensively used to evaluate market risk, and its
importance is unlikely to diminish. While for efficient and robust risk management, banks
and regulators should be familiar with the properties of ES and they will benefit significantly
from the new risk measure sooner or later.
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5.4.3 Counter-factual Experiment
Determining capital requirements is a major concern for bank policymakers. The recently
settled Basel III framework will direct banks to allocate increased equity capital to finance
their assets than was previously required. In the earlier literature, researchers examined the
optimal bank capital from the view of cost (Miles et al., 2013). While this thesis argues the
question from the perspective of the arrangement of bank capital.
Leverage amplifies the level of risk. By the results of impulse responses, a positive leverage
shock will encourage the economic growth. Whereas, this acceleration will not last invariably
with the increasing value of leverage. I examine the connection between leverage and the
economy across the GVAR model by giving a set of values in leverage. Instead of using
natural level data, this experiment takes first difference quarterly on data to simulate the
trend. In other words, all variables are applied to their growth rates. This is because this
counter-factual experiment aims to figure out the real relation between the leverage ratio and
the growth of the economy.
Another variable should be added into the simulation process is the square of leverage.
Leverage growth has been proved to be negatively aligned with VaR growth rate (Adrian
and Shin, 2013). With all conditions remaining equal, companies that have higher leverage
indicate a greater ability to earn profits. However, the relationship between leverage and risk
cannot be monotonic; a highly leveraged financial system is one that is prone to collapse.
This is because a financial leverage ratio forms the variation of the debt to equity ratio.
The company with a considerable amount of debt is more likely to not pay back the debt,
which increase the probability of default. It is worthy to observe that the leverage square is
involved in the GVAR model to describe the non-monotonic relationship between leverage
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and GDP growth, which make the GVAR model more effective for achieving the research
aim, compared to the based model by Gross et al. (2016).
Figure 5.7 shows the simulation scenarios of the leverage ratio and the macroeconomic
variables from the cross-countries section. The simulation of macro-economy in the US is
generated by inputting a set of value into X-axis6 in bank leverage ratio. And all the output
are shown in the y-axis as the simulation results.
Fig. 5.7 US Simulation
6The value of leverage ratio is defined monotonically increasing within a range from ’1’ to ’72’ during the
72 periods.
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GDP growth
From the simulation results, the relation between GDP growth and the leverage ratio is
worthy of explore. Under the increase in leverage ratio, GDP growth rate increases till the
peak point and then fall. By definition, financial leverage represents the utilisation of debt in
the bank’s financial structure. The higher the leverage ratio, the larger is the debt the company
borrowed to fund investment. Assume the financial leverage raise due to the increase of
credit supply for banks. The leverage ratio is a critical index for banks, managing risks by
controlling leverage is the most important thing for risk managers. The result also reflects
the balance between profits and risk.
Housing price growth
Similar to GDP growth, the housing price growth simulation forms a convex curve with a
peak point. Housing price is affected by several factors such as inflation and interest rate
(Tsatsaronis and Zhu, 2004). However, it has been observed that housing loan is the key
element and is highly related to the volatility of housing price (Oikarinen, 2009). Since it
is assumed that banks raise the amount of capital to extend the corresponding amount into
loans, this could lower the interest rate to stimulate current and future economic activities.
Consequently, a higher housing price will be expected under increasing loan value.
However, the relation based on the results does not appear to be monotonic. Within the
amplification of the leverage ratio, housing price growth reduces continuously till the last
period. It is also reasonable from the perspective of real economy that excessive credit
will be detrimental for the market. A good example of this is considered the most recent
106 Global VAR Model
global financial crisis caused by the loan losses across US banks, which led to a downturn in
macroeconomics.
Inflation growth
IPD is an indicator that represents inflation at the corporate and government level. Addition-
ally, inflation constitutes the spillover of the price on the products and service by increasing
the quantity of money or credit. Essential conditions growth in inflation are caused from
two sides: demand pull inflation and cost-push inflation. A positive credit supply shock will
stimulate consumption and drive up the demand for products and service. Thereby, demand
increases inflation through more consumption. Figure 5.7 certainly demonstrates this relation
between inflation and credit supply. The leverage increases in the company with the growth
of inflation.
Long-term interest rate growth
The long-term interest rate can be affected by many factors such as inflation, short-term
policy rate and economic growth. From Figure 5.7 we can see the long-term interest rate has
a slight increase then decline with leverage ratio growth.
The leverage ratio is a useful mechanism to indicate the risk for financial organisations
even for the policymakers. The BCBS has set the framework to track the leverage ratio and
the underlying components since 2011 for banks and keeps revising afterwards. Now the
leverage ratio becomes a mandatory part of Basel III requirements. For the managers, the
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arrangement of bank capital should be reasonable and take account of the underlying risks.
Too high leverage level could be harmful to not only the financial institution but also the
whole economy.
Economic Implication
Several reasons can be introduced here to explain the non-monotonic relationship between
economic growth and leverage ratio. Financial leverage represents the utilisation of debt
in the financial structure, the higher the leverage the larger is the debt borrowed to fund
investment. The rapid growth of leverage promotes the development of the capital market
which could contribute to the economic growth in the short run through high financial market
liquidity (Adrian and Shin, 2010). However the trend is not monotonic in the long term. High
credit supply and demand will add instability of the financial market which could damage
GDP growth (Kelly et al., 2013).
Inflation refers to the price of goods and service in the market. The inflation growth rate rises
when the leverage ratio increases. A high leverage ratio illustrates that financial institutions
have more capital to invest which will encourage economic growth and further enhance the
inflation (Hochman and Palmon, 1985). Also, an increase in inflation would bring a decline
in the purchasing power of money which further decrease consumption and GDP level which
fit the simulation result of GDP growth.
A housing price index is determined by many elements such as GDP, inflation, interest rate
and credit level. High inflation will increase the HPI via the high price level. The HPI
growth may increase when more investments are made in the market due to the wealth effect,
108 Global VAR Model
however long periods of elevated inflation followed by a sharp deceleration of price growth
may bread misalignments between house prices and longer-term determinants of residential
real estate values (Tsatsaronis and Zhu, 2004).
The long-term interest rate can be affected by many factors such as inflation, short-term
policy rate and economic growth. Interest rates and inflation tend to be inversely correlated
in general. People prefer to spend more money under a low-interest rate rather than investing
in the long-term government bond. Meanwhile, long-term interest rates are one of the
determinants of business investment. Low long-term interest rates encourage investment in
new equipment, and high-interest rates discourage it. It further strengthens the economy to
grow and inflation to increase. Stable growth of leverage ratio and the long-term interest
rate is inversely correlated from the simulation result. It is because a long-term accelerating
leverage ratio will improve the inflation level and certainly will reduce the long-term interest
rate growth.
Although the US simulation results can be explained using economic theory, it must admit
that other countries from Group Seven cannot easily access such a consequence, especially
in the GDP response. The US has been positioned as the world largest economy since 1871,
and it has been affecting the economic development of other countries through political and
international trade. The GVAR model represents a comprehensive system that comprises the
vector auto-regression model for individual states, in which the native variables are related to
corresponding foreign variables that have been constructed exclusively to comply with the
international trade, financial or monetary policy requirements. Therefore, other countries
in the group received the leverage effect from the United States. As a result, the estimation
of the GVAR model provides an effective measure of the leverage effects in the US while it
cannot capture the reality of other countries sufficiently.
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5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I further analyse the comparison of VaR and ES from the perspective of their
influence on macroeconomics. The research is conducted by applying a GVAR model that
links the three elements macro-economy, financial market and central banks together. The
sign restriction approach is used in the identification of structural shocks.
The banking sector is found to play a critical role in facilitating credit and economic growth.
At the same time, capital requirement is designed to offset the possible risks by business
practices and risk-taking behaviour. Risk managers tend to provide suggestions to adjust
debt and assets, in order to attain a target level of leverage. A starting point of link this
chapter and the previous chapter together is that by switch the two risk assessment method,
an adjustment of capital requirement could occur due to the property of expected shortfall.
Thereby, a capital shock brings the whole economy to the next level.
The results provide consistent trends on the effects that capital requirement could make on
GDP, housing price, inflation and long-term interest rate. In consequence of shock simulation,
GDP is generally benefiting from a positive capital shock and the steady state is driven to a
higher level afterwards. However, an increasing leverage ratio could only contribute to GDP
growth when their value is limited. After that, high leverage ratio could be very harmful to the
economic growth. Meanwhile, except for Japan, there is a positive response of capital shock
on inflation in all other countries. Besides, the leverage ratio is positively related to inflation
growth in the long run. The impulse responses of housing price index vary from different
countries. But forecasting simulation states a convex curve relation between leverage ratio
and housing price growth in the US. Last but not least, I cannot summary the effects on
long-term interest rate through countries results, but most countries have been negatively
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affected by a positive capital shock. In addition, leverage ratio and long-term interest rate
growth are negatively correlated.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Many researchers in the past years have studied the topic of comparing Value at Risk and
Expected Shortfall. Most of them agree that ES is a better risk measure than VaR whereas
some of them argue that the backtesting for ES is difficult. In this thesis, I compare VaR and
ES from different respects: intellectual properties, risk capital requirement and the influence
on the macroeconomics.
First of all, a list of properties has been made as the standards for proper risk measures. Value
at Risk can precisely and efficiently describe the size of market risk whereas it does not
work well under market stress especially during a financial crisis. Meanwhile, VaR does not
satisfy sub-additivity hence it is not a coherent risk measure. The risk cannot be diversified
when applying VaR to estimate the portfolio. Moreover, although VaR meets the property
of elicitability, the failure rate of backtesting result for VaR estimation is nonnegligible.
It illustrates that VaR is not an efficient risk measure tested by the real market losses. In
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addition, VaR usually underestimates the market risk, and it is unable to capture tail risks
compared by ES.
ES is an alternative risk measure, and it estimates all market risks beyond VaR. ES fulfils all
the properties of coherence including the sub-additivity. The risk can be diversified when
using ES as the risk measure to estimate the market risk. Banks could benefit not only from
evaluating market risk efficiently but also from the view of saving capital. Besides, ES is
sensitive to the tail risks and also works better under market stress than VaR. This property
also leads to a better test result when backtesting ES. Although the previous literature argues
that it is hard to backtest ES, some papers still demonstrate the possibility and feasibility of
backtesting.
In chapter 4, a new idea to compare VaR and ES is introduced from the view of bank
capital requirement. I collect the last stock price for 25 most representative banks in G7
countries according to their total assets value and follow the Basel Accords to estimate their
minimum capital requirement. Historical Simulation and Filtered Historical Simulation
have been applied on account of unknown data distribution. Both methods conclude similar
consequences that ES could save the minimum capital requirement and make effective
utilisation of bank capital. Banks using ES could diversify the market risks and save capital
because ES is a coherent risk measure. Moreover, by both backtesting methods via real
losses or Basel Accords, the multiplier for VaR is larger than which for ES.
The comparison is taken place not only from the financial market itself but also through the
interaction between individual sections among the whole economic system. In chapter 5, I
further study the comparison by applying a GVAR model which associates macroeconomics,
financial market and central banks together. Sign restriction approach is used here to identify
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the structural shocks. Since the banking sector is now playing a critical role in facilitating
credit and economic growth, it is worthy to test the effects of changing risk measure from
VaR to ES on the macroeconomics through banking channel. The connection between risk
measure and the banking sector is conducted via the leverage ratio. Under the consequence
that switching from VaR to ES will reduce the capital requirement, the leverage will go up
due to increased assets value. And the degree of growth depends on the correlation difference
between risk capital and leverage ratio. The result provides consistent trends on the effects
that capital requirement could make GDP, housing price, inflation and long-term interest
rate. GDP is generally benefiting from a positive leverage ratio shock, and the steady state is
driven to a higher level afterwards. However, the contribution is not monotonic where the
increasing leverage value will be harmful to the economy by reason of high-risk level.
Combine the consequences of each chapter, ES is concluded as a better risk measure than
VaR in spite of some backtesting difficulties. This result supports the dominant point about
the topic of comapring VaR and ES. Nevertheless, the research angle differs from the previous
studies. The comparison is conducted not simply from the risk measure values but via their
risk capital requirements. The risk management aims to optimise the utilisation of capital
to achieve high profit. Therefore, from the view of bank capital to compare risk measures
conform the object of risk management.
Macroeconomic policy and risk management require taking account of the increasing interde-
pendencies that exist across markets and countries. It is worthy to test risk measures via how
it affects the whole economy. GVAR model is a comprehensive system generated based on
individual VAR equations. It conducts the quantitative analysis of the relative importance of
different shocks and channels of transmission mechanisms by providing a general, practical
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and global modelling framework. This chapter further substantiates the superiority of using
ES across the influence that it may exert on the macroeconomics.
In conclusion, this thesis finds out that ES seems the better risk measure for use in general
and practice compared with VaR. The BCBS has changed the internal risk assessment model
from VaR and ES and required banks to follow the rule by this year. The backtesting of ES
has always been a problem for the popularisation of ES. However, many studies have shown
that the shortness of hard backtesting ES can be carefully mitigated. Hopefully, in the near
future, ES can take the place of VaR and help risk management to achieve better results.
Although the significant consequences have been detected in this thesis, some potential
limitations of this study are noticeable. In a typical GVAR model, the weight of each variable
should be drawn from a weight matrix which is estimated according to certain variables.
Whereas in my GVAR model, I take the weighted average as the weight due to the high
dimension and complex model structure. The weight could change the calculation of each
variable and make an influence on the model estimation result. Therefore, it could affect the
regression results by reducing the sensitivity of the GVAR model.
Furthermore, it has been proved that the shift in risk assessment model from VaR to ES
can help banks save the risk capital requirement and rearrange the distribution of capital
by increasing credit supply using Historical Simulation and Filtered Historical Simulation.
During the calculation, a multiplier is required as a penalty indicator for both VaR and ES. In
Basel Accord, the multiplier should be the higher of backtesting result or stressed test result.
While in this thesis, due to the difficulty of the stressed test, I directly use the backtesting
result as the multiplier. Although in most cases the results of backtesting and the stressed
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test may show a similar tendency, it could still affect the comparison results by simplifying
the testing procedures.
This thesis studies the influence of various risk measures on the macroeconomy through
a Global Vector Autoregression model. The result confirms the assumption that ES is a
better risk measure method not only for the financial market but also for the whole economy.
In the future study, deeper and broader topics are worth to explore around risk assessment
and management. Firstly, various models can be applied to find out the interdependency
between the financial market and macroeconomy such as factor model and the DSGE model.
Furthermore, the risk measure method is not just located among the probability distribution.
Credit risk, operation risk and other risks such as war and oil prices are worthy to study in
the future.
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Appendix A
ES Backtesting
The backtesting of ES uses the reference by Acerbi and Szekely (2014), and is based on the
VaR backtesting results. The test statistic is given as:
Z =
1
N pVaR
N
∑
t=1
RtIt
ESt
+1 (A.1)
where,
N is the number of time periods in the test window.
Rt is the rate of return.
pVaR is the confidence level.
It is the VaR failure indicator on period t.
The expected value for this test statistic is 0, any negative value determines that ES underes-
timates the market risk. The backtesting takes advantage of stability of the unconditional
test statistic, and the backtesting result of VaR could contribute to compute the statistic as an
indicator. Moreover, Z is sensitive to both the severity and number of VaR failures relative to
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ES measure. Thus, a single but large VaR failure relative to ES may cause the rejection of a
model in a certain period while a large loss on a test day when ES estimation is also large
may not impact the test results as much as ES is smaller.
Appendix B
Variable Form
Different variables are modeled in log level or quarter to quarter different form regard to
their values. An augmented Dickey–Fuller test is applied to examine the stationary of data.
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Table B.1 Variable Form
US Log First Difference Stationary Non-stationary
GDP ✓ ✓ ✓
IPD ✓ ✓ ✓
HPI ✓ ✓ ✓
LTIR ✓ ✓
LOAN ✓ ✓ ✓
LEV ✓ ✓
LIR ✓ ✓
DR ✓ ✓
POD ✓ ✓
STPR ✓ ✓
Table B.2 Foreign Variable Form
US Log First Difference Stationary Non-stationary
GDP ✓ ✓ ✓
IPD ✓ ✓ ✓
HPI ✓ ✓ ✓
LTIR ✓ ✓
LOAN ✓ ✓ ✓
LEV ✓ ✓
LIR ✓ ✓
DR ✓ ✓
POD ✓ ✓
STPR ✓ ✓
Appendix C
Unit Root Test
128 Unit Root Test
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130 Unit Root Test
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132 Unit Root Test
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134 Unit Root Test
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138 Unit Root Test
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Estimated Parameters
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Table D.1 US Estimated Parameters
GDP IPD HPI LTIR LOAN LEV LIR DR POD STPR
Coefficient 0.008 0.002 0.006 0.109 0.068 0.098 -0.031 0.013 -0.001 -0.071
GDPt−1 -0.003 0.020 0.083 -0.033 -2.320 -5.273 5.080 1.091 9.107 6.156
IPDt−1 -0.838 0.336 -0.466 -21.035 5.133 -27.622 -8.322 -5.743 -54.418 -15.660
HPIt−1 0.102 0.028 0.974 2.895 0.698 2.454 0.553 0.292 0.674 4.714
LT IRt−1 -0.005 -0.003 -0.014 -0.114 -0.099 0.166 -0.089 -0.051 0.077 -0.011
LOANt−1 -0.019 0.003 -0.011 0.360 -0.113 3.264 0.239 -0.020 -1.698 0.638
LEVt−1 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.063 -0.033 -0.012 -0.012 -0.005 0.259 -0.055
LIRt−1 -0.007 0.001 0.002 0.404 -0.157 -2.605 -0.202 -0.163 -0.346 0.956
DRt−1 0.010 0.003 0.004 -0.006 0.513 3.353 0.072 0.329 -0.240 -0.709
PODt−1 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.069 0.075 0.009 -0.058 -0.022 -0.010 -0.190
ST PRt−1 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.190 -0.020 0.467 0.067 0.090 0.086 0.453
FGDPt 0.266 -0.043 0.059 -3.012 -0.028 -30.753 -4.348 -1.592 0.044 -10.246
FIPDt -0.428 0.152 -0.500 6.783 -11.239 -5.502 9.579 -0.196 5.900 -5.040
FHPIt 0.052 0.004 -0.014 0.463 0.021 8.452 0.247 0.382 9.718 3.570
FLT IRt 0.003 0.000 0.005 1.453 0.049 -0.184 -0.030 -0.014 0.099 1.048
FLOANt 0.002 0.007 0.019 -0.057 -0.263 -3.952 -0.760 -0.334 1.189 -0.363
FLEVt 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.016 -0.003 -0.063 0.012 -0.002 0.004 0.005
FLIRt -0.003 0.005 0.000 -0.574 -0.186 2.835 0.261 0.172 0.166 -0.227
FDRt 0.001 -0.006 0.003 0.681 0.328 -3.288 -0.565 -0.209 -0.216 0.282
FPODt -0.012 0.002 -0.004 0.047 0.210 -2.582 -0.630 -0.165 -0.275 -0.491
FST PRt 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.034 0.043 -0.383 0.040 0.023 -0.015 -0.044
FGDPt−1 0.195 0.014 -0.534 -9.826 0.559 50.460 3.037 2.386 7.672 -1.043
FIPDt−1 -0.009 0.208 0.158 7.642 -8.902 -50.152 10.046 4.270 1.917 27.380
FHPIt−1 -0.012 0.009 -0.006 -0.411 0.104 -2.296 0.131 -0.217 3.945 1.713
FLT IRt−1 -0.001 0.005 0.012 -0.218 0.109 -0.092 0.105 -0.004 -0.313 -0.695
FLOANt−1 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.069 -0.163 1.828 -0.337 -0.103 0.759 -0.193
FLEVt−1 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.017 -0.003 -0.046 0.008 0.006 -0.081 -0.005
FLIRt−1 -0.026 0.003 -0.027 0.527 -0.207 -1.405 -0.043 0.079 1.078 2.176
FDRt−1 0.028 -0.002 0.035 -0.392 0.104 2.044 0.069 -0.129 -0.644 -1.789
FPODt−1 0.005 0.004 -0.012 0.363 0.252 0.993 -0.021 -0.001 -0.127 0.087
FST PRt−1 0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.023 -0.032 -0.036 -0.128 -0.035 0.257 -0.022
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Table D.2 UK Estimated Parameters
GDP IPD HPI LTIR LOAN LEV LIR DR POD STPR
Coefficient 0.000 0.004 0.000 -0.099 -0.001 -1.590 -0.026 -0.028 0.101 -0.137
GDPt−1 0.291 0.115 -0.112 -4.661 1.412 21.850 0.408 0.290 -8.205 -5.372
IPDt−1 -0.369 -0.110 0.353 -1.306 0.851 -3.446 -3.296 -3.476 2.441 -5.942
HPIt−1 0.009 0.002 0.421 1.538 1.181 6.577 -0.816 -0.675 1.746 0.147
LT IRt−1 0.007 -0.004 0.005 -0.130 0.268 5.431 -0.237 -0.178 0.283 -0.332
LOANt−1 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.056 -0.885 -1.749 0.190 0.144 0.137 0.175
LEVt−1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.004 -0.250 0.008 0.014 0.007 0.014
LIRt−1 -0.019 -0.039 0.129 0.342 0.036 -4.288 0.298 0.512 0.325 0.948
DRt−1 0.018 0.025 -0.175 -0.168 -0.312 -1.462 -0.145 -0.438 0.010 -0.633
PODt−1 0.001 -0.001 0.009 0.014 0.072 -0.086 0.007 0.018 -0.075 0.023
ST PRt−1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.012 0.219 -0.232 -5.617 0.175 0.108 -0.353 0.402
FGDPt 0.462 -0.108 1.151 -2.227 3.546 11.732 -0.670 1.562 -8.446 4.021
FIPDt 1.049 0.062 -1.464 17.276 4.459 2.295 4.754 9.353 -18.609 17.178
FHPIt -0.049 -0.026 0.499 1.845 0.473 13.834 -0.699 -1.392 2.936 2.908
FLT IRt 0.002 0.000 -0.001 1.140 -0.003 0.617 -0.085 -0.088 0.137 1.069
FLOANt -0.030 0.014 0.083 0.047 -0.096 -8.346 0.152 0.068 0.139 0.106
FLEVt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 -0.004 -0.092 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002
FLIRt -0.010 0.023 0.017 0.232 -0.031 3.789 -0.335 -0.345 0.030 0.032
FDRt -0.011 0.020 0.051 -0.197 0.033 -0.414 -0.048 -0.051 -0.018 -0.287
FPODt -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 0.042 -0.031 1.371 -0.022 -0.054 -0.073 0.128
FST PRt 0.000 0.001 0.006 -0.188 0.050 -0.677 0.089 0.054 0.017 -0.053
FGDPt−1 0.216 -0.152 0.215 0.734 -0.780 9.051 0.533 1.954 7.198 4.691
FIPDt−1 -0.434 0.293 0.528 23.044 -6.231 -5.416 6.966 5.918 -22.816 26.610
FHPIt−1 -0.021 0.054 -0.344 -2.180 -1.386 4.975 -0.056 -0.861 0.187 -2.262
FLT IRt−1 -0.005 0.003 0.024 0.169 -0.019 -0.283 0.108 0.163 -0.032 0.256
FLOANt−1 0.019 0.022 0.071 -0.570 0.360 -2.069 0.023 -0.069 -0.368 -0.403
FLEVt−1 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.014 -0.001 0.000 -0.005 -0.005
FLIRt−1 0.005 0.011 0.003 0.040 -0.001 -0.525 0.063 0.095 -0.243 0.174
FDRt−1 -0.008 0.012 0.018 -0.242 -0.109 -3.218 -0.001 -0.027 0.151 -0.227
FPODt−1 -0.003 0.007 -0.016 -0.111 0.015 -1.433 -0.097 -0.094 0.024 -0.281
FST PRt−1 0.000 -0.003 -0.010 -0.022 0.009 1.451 -0.072 -0.078 0.143 -0.061
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Table D.3 FN Estimated Parameters
GDP IPD HPI LTIR LOAN LEV LIR DR POD STPR
Coefficient 0.001 0.001 -0.012 -0.006 0.037 0.369 -0.043 -0.041 -0.046 -0.109
GDPt−1 0.490 0.070 0.796 15.826 -0.286 3.927 -3.015 -2.558 16.354 32.794
IPDt−1 -0.366 0.473 1.368 2.309 1.903 2.617 9.491 5.544 -2.422 3.272
HPIt−1 0.070 0.020 0.487 0.215 0.576 2.426 0.427 0.427 8.203 -0.354
LT IRt−1 0.000 -0.001 0.013 0.219 0.097 0.747 -0.010 -0.003 0.114 -0.038
LOANt−1 0.004 0.005 -0.018 -0.051 -0.834 2.032 0.002 0.068 -0.175 0.623
LEVt−1 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.006 -0.518 -0.002 -0.002 0.010 0.014
LIRt−1 -0.019 0.011 0.273 0.232 -0.122 -3.272 -0.313 -0.195 3.217 5.038
DRt−1 0.021 -0.005 -0.333 -0.781 0.057 3.934 0.365 0.275 -2.881 -5.354
PODt−1 -0.001 0.000 -0.008 -0.021 -0.021 -0.137 -0.027 -0.027 -0.058 -0.067
ST PRt−1 -0.003 0.000 -0.007 -0.256 -0.055 -3.065 -0.036 -0.016 -0.168 0.302
FGDPt -0.024 0.032 -0.207 0.558 -0.866 -9.489 4.192 3.900 -5.264 -1.767
FIPDt 0.034 -0.114 2.029 -2.521 -9.063 3.188 4.526 5.353 -32.560 3.070
FHPIt -0.025 -0.011 0.020 0.439 -0.881 18.357 0.203 0.127 -2.775 -1.899
FLT IRt -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.053 0.119 3.512 -0.062 -0.072 0.224 -0.153
FLOANt 0.005 0.002 0.087 -0.476 1.655 -0.355 -0.686 -0.492 0.275 -2.485
FLEVt 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.005 0.028 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003
FLIRt -0.009 -0.001 -0.004 -0.319 0.095 -8.567 -0.325 -0.349 0.087 -0.129
FDRt -0.004 -0.001 0.016 0.110 0.234 -1.138 0.481 0.492 -0.475 -0.794
FPODt 0.007 0.001 0.014 -0.094 0.005 0.085 -0.005 0.011 0.192 0.147
FST PRt 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.362 -0.019 -3.567 0.034 0.034 0.020 0.427
FGDPt−1 0.080 -0.034 0.291 -6.261 -1.474 -2.282 -2.202 -1.675 9.977 4.600
FIPDt−1 -0.082 0.151 -0.603 -18.094 3.760 -16.287 -4.212 -4.449 -0.538 -17.596
FHPIt−1 0.004 0.015 0.039 -1.542 -0.108 -24.595 -0.358 -0.208 -2.585 0.684
FLT IRt−1 -0.001 -0.001 0.007 -0.121 -0.043 6.652 0.007 0.018 0.151 -0.009
FLOANt−1 0.007 0.001 0.197 0.530 1.313 -4.685 -0.385 -0.387 2.190 0.425
FLEVt−1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.006 -0.009 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.000
FLIRt−1 -0.004 0.001 -0.013 0.409 0.349 -3.955 -0.222 -0.231 0.575 -0.578
FDRt−1 -0.003 -0.002 0.055 0.194 0.063 -9.018 -0.066 -0.087 -0.283 0.563
FPODt−1 0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.017 0.010 -1.029 0.060 0.065 -0.341 -0.022
FST PRt−1 0.003 0.001 0.004 -0.176 -0.114 -0.156 0.115 0.111 -0.122 0.203
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Table D.4 BD Estimated Parameters
GDP IPD HPI LTIR LOAN LEV LIR DR POD STPR
Coefficient 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.014 0.010 0.283 -0.009 0.012 0.218 -0.007
GDPt−1 -0.006 0.008 0.242 3.876 -0.650 7.268 -2.914 -2.271 2.214 6.404
IPDt−1 0.246 0.199 0.326 7.252 2.317 -1.926 1.575 -9.232 8.199 -2.146
HPIt−1 -0.157 0.091 0.285 1.567 -0.169 -9.412 -5.886 0.357 -2.155 -0.424
LT IRt−1 -0.004 -0.002 0.002 0.236 0.028 2.389 -0.096 0.020 -0.171 -0.067
LOANt−1 0.014 0.001 0.025 -0.085 0.158 3.482 0.737 0.086 -0.089 0.154
LEVt−1 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.010 0.004 0.092 0.005 -0.006 0.024 0.008
LIRt−1 0.005 -0.002 0.004 0.153 0.057 -2.443 -0.156 -0.119 -0.093 0.411
DRt−1 0.019 -0.001 0.009 -0.818 -0.131 3.755 0.221 -0.118 1.983 0.005
PODt−1 -0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.023 0.031 3.409 -0.054 -0.075 -0.247 0.061
ST PRt−1 0.012 -0.002 -0.002 -0.053 0.076 0.340 0.040 0.085 -0.188 0.156
FGDPt -0.014 -0.004 0.009 3.717 -1.821 -1.070 4.814 -0.308 -6.049 -1.822
FIPDt -0.096 0.061 0.346 -19.755 -1.806 2.296 15.411 5.047 -16.960 -5.350
FHPIt -0.059 -0.002 0.015 -0.238 -0.371 1.537 0.519 0.263 -2.691 -0.807
FLT IRt -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.090 -0.030 0.588 0.168 0.104 0.255 -0.090
FLOANt 0.010 0.022 -0.018 0.064 0.453 -1.607 -0.456 0.379 -1.882 0.057
FLEVt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.046 -0.008 -0.004 -0.011 -0.002
FLIRt -0.013 0.006 -0.002 -0.349 0.114 -1.086 -0.106 0.079 -0.007 -0.438
FDRt 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.297 0.148 -3.091 -0.278 0.261 -0.282 0.416
FPODt 0.012 0.004 -0.002 -0.017 -0.072 -5.385 -0.097 0.086 0.242 0.212
FST PRt 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.444 -0.002 -1.366 0.098 -0.046 0.053 0.329
FGDPt−1 0.002 -0.044 -0.086 -8.151 -0.782 1.317 0.575 -2.634 9.701 3.734
FIPDt−1 0.200 0.264 -0.078 -3.847 7.510 -1.380 -24.077 4.681 -3.449 -20.389
FHPIt−1 0.025 0.013 0.005 -0.890 -0.198 -2.537 -0.444 0.069 -1.137 0.067
FLT IRt−1 -0.004 0.000 0.000 0.021 -0.017 2.361 -0.171 -0.033 -0.327 -0.249
FLOANt−1 -0.019 0.002 -0.031 1.588 0.413 8.947 -0.324 0.425 -0.969 0.912
FLEVt−1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.015 -0.002 0.001 0.008 0.000
FLIRt−1 -0.011 0.002 -0.004 0.283 0.141 2.721 0.024 0.200 -0.393 -0.132
FDRt−1 -0.011 0.001 -0.001 0.223 0.040 -2.738 -0.069 -0.005 -0.734 0.108
FPODt−1 0.001 0.002 -0.004 0.103 -0.026 -3.440 0.015 0.079 -0.332 0.145
FST PRt−1 0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.277 -0.104 0.015 0.158 -0.037 0.218 0.077
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Table D.5 IT Estimated Parameters
GDP IPD HPI LTIR LOAN LEV LIR DR POD STPR
Coefficient 0.001 0.006 -0.002 0.082 0.074 0.233 -0.289 0.323 0.352 0.063
GDPt−1 0.704 0.025 0.295 -2.535 2.589 -4.492 13.633 8.714 5.953 10.765
IPDt−1 0.051 -0.527 -0.055 -10.459 8.927 8.450 6.359 23.149 -2.033 -3.312
HPIt−1 0.087 0.190 0.725 6.463 2.961 -11.395 -3.168 -13.394 15.824 4.273
LT IRt−1 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.286 -0.058 -0.214 0.147 0.127 -0.355 0.115
LOANt−1 0.001 -0.001 0.009 0.596 -0.255 -0.930 -0.754 -0.734 0.010 -0.290
LEVt−1 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.048 -0.027 0.248 0.066 -0.044 0.073 0.036
LIRt−1 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.092 0.001 -0.639 -0.595 -0.268 -0.018 -0.003
DRt−1 0.000 0.001 0.003 -0.026 -0.036 -0.456 -0.226 -0.280 -0.103 0.087
PODt−1 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.025 0.008 0.248 0.144 0.125 -0.503 -0.062
ST PRt−1 -0.006 0.002 0.000 0.199 -0.147 0.481 -0.171 0.045 -0.274 0.276
FGDPt -0.060 0.046 0.014 8.311 -2.199 4.635 -9.896 -0.534 -0.606 1.987
FIPDt -0.527 -0.167 -0.251 0.292 -26.872 -7.337 1.171 -9.473 -0.902 -2.869
FHPIt -0.006 -0.015 -0.024 2.928 -1.439 6.117 -4.639 1.030 -0.772 -2.184
FLT IRt -0.008 0.000 -0.006 -0.038 0.037 0.899 0.468 -0.066 0.264 -0.065
FLOANt -0.030 0.001 0.072 -1.257 0.062 2.548 -2.054 -5.105 -4.078 -0.179
FLEVt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 -0.002 0.024 -0.018 0.012 -0.023 0.006
FLIRt -0.017 0.018 0.139 -1.277 -0.377 5.770 2.945 -1.329 -3.301 -0.761
FDRt 0.023 -0.024 -0.116 -0.371 0.767 -1.230 -1.507 1.320 2.262 0.812
FPODt 0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.251 0.033 -0.197 0.143 0.403 0.402 0.199
FST PRt 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.439 0.030 -0.284 -0.135 -0.215 0.034 0.621
FGDPt−1 0.003 0.004 -0.033 -14.164 0.517 -3.160 -6.918 -4.091 -3.595 0.709
FIPDt−1 0.384 -0.058 0.522 -25.496 7.445 0.871 33.158 7.329 -11.316 -29.309
FHPIt−1 0.009 0.017 0.031 -1.113 -0.642 0.752 -1.278 -0.286 -0.772 -0.507
FLT IRt−1 -0.003 0.002 0.006 -0.183 0.007 -0.203 0.316 -0.132 -0.521 0.009
FLOANt−1 0.030 -0.014 0.041 0.061 -0.430 -7.321 -2.850 -0.193 -3.353 0.578
FLEVt−1 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.004 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.011 -0.013 -0.004
FLIRt−1 0.023 -0.050 -0.105 0.707 -0.590 -0.554 -8.684 3.978 -2.725 0.250
FDRt−1 0.011 0.017 0.063 0.204 0.633 0.588 2.622 -0.281 3.843 -1.009
FPODt−1 0.000 -0.004 0.006 0.019 0.031 -0.156 -0.186 0.069 -0.668 0.093
FST PRt−1 0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.515 0.076 0.045 0.552 0.494 -0.039 0.053
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Table D.6 CN Estimated Parameters
GDP IPD HPI LTIR LOAN LEV LIR DR POD STPR
Coefficient 0.007 0.004 -0.001 0.044 -0.009 -0.350 0.014 -0.013 0.088 -0.048
GDPt−1 0.082 0.043 0.021 0.483 -0.201 -0.401 -0.214 -0.102 1.633 1.051
IPDt−1 0.341 0.211 0.433 -2.622 1.446 2.905 0.164 0.623 -4.959 1.936
HPIt−1 0.169 -0.038 0.032 -1.230 1.156 -0.656 0.159 0.089 1.045 -0.804
LT IRt−1 -0.014 0.006 -0.034 0.338 -0.029 -1.466 0.106 0.029 0.151 -0.710
LOANt−1 0.000 0.014 -0.033 -0.008 0.031 0.269 0.318 0.137 1.419 -0.026
LEVt−1 0.004 0.000 0.005 -0.006 0.016 0.240 0.008 0.003 -0.252 -0.031
LIRt−1 -0.066 -0.005 0.082 0.359 0.426 -7.898 -0.413 -0.196 -2.972 2.325
DRt−1 0.081 0.023 -0.250 -0.794 -0.726 11.863 0.618 0.484 6.999 -3.522
PODt−1 -0.043 -0.002 -0.012 0.022 0.004 -0.861 0.048 0.017 0.199 0.113
ST PRt−1 -0.039 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.076 -0.012 0.021 -0.339 0.327
FGDPt 1.173 0.127 -0.292 2.065 -1.155 12.868 0.354 0.557 3.232 -8.023
FIPDt -3.226 -0.376 2.118 19.364 3.860 -3.152 4.789 3.592 -6.640 -9.173
FHPIt 0.203 0.040 -0.088 -0.568 -0.054 -0.269 0.184 0.097 -1.137 -0.078
FLT IRt -0.008 0.002 0.020 0.849 0.011 -0.757 0.021 0.014 -0.292 0.063
FLOANt 0.067 0.050 0.070 0.285 -0.242 -1.221 -0.114 -0.162 0.822 -0.213
FLEVt 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 -0.005 0.014 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 -0.017
FLIRt 0.076 0.022 -0.038 0.139 -0.141 -0.920 0.126 -0.014 1.000 -0.874
FDRt 0.012 -0.002 0.018 0.331 -0.075 -1.791 0.189 0.044 -0.324 0.194
FPODt 0.037 0.003 0.026 -0.098 0.066 0.619 -0.063 -0.015 -0.402 -0.003
FST PRt -0.038 -0.002 0.005 -0.030 0.039 -0.012 -0.004 0.034 -0.048 0.583
FGDPt−1 -0.880 -0.077 0.436 -3.367 1.378 -0.521 -1.832 -0.780 -1.479 3.478
FIPDt−1 -2.176 -0.214 1.596 -18.265 -1.515 4.787 -7.155 -1.189 9.370 15.164
FHPIt−1 0.283 0.001 -0.025 -0.786 0.378 0.389 0.020 0.012 -1.813 -1.912
FLT IRt−1 -0.014 -0.009 0.036 -0.118 -0.020 0.845 -0.100 -0.034 -0.261 0.762
FLOANt−1 0.281 0.025 0.124 0.170 -0.197 2.100 0.038 0.122 0.481 1.117
FLEVt−1 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.001
FLIRt−1 0.054 0.009 -0.032 -0.168 -0.137 1.049 0.002 -0.042 -0.229 -0.431
FDRt−1 0.066 0.012 0.021 0.175 -0.249 0.692 0.089 0.078 -0.138 -0.001
FPODt−1 0.013 -0.002 -0.006 0.125 -0.051 0.492 -0.031 -0.031 -0.151 -0.030
FST PRt−1 0.008 -0.001 0.017 0.053 0.030 0.309 0.012 0.011 0.001 -0.134
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Table D.7 JP Estimated Parameters
GDP IPD HPI LTIR LOAN LEV LIR DR POD STPR
Coefficient 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.041 -0.155 -9.771 0.037 0.015 -0.648 0.989
GDPt−1 0.087 -0.005 -0.001 0.158 -1.000 6.213 0.118 -0.057 1.048 6.231
IPDt−1 -3.706 0.165 -0.013 -0.814 3.239 -1.534 1.273 0.806 -1.218 -2.145
HPIt−1 13.315 -0.251 0.008 -2.586 -3.969 3.873 -0.759 -1.952 -16.868 19.519
LT IRt−1 0.037 -0.009 0.000 -0.020 -0.153 16.426 -0.022 -0.024 -0.495 -0.182
LOANt−1 0.000 0.006 0.002 -0.114 0.249 3.735 -0.035 -0.016 0.563 -0.637
LEVt−1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.345 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.001
LIRt−1 -0.087 -0.003 0.007 0.135 -1.285 -63.858 0.023 0.127 -2.650 -4.319
DRt−1 0.152 0.033 -0.006 -0.668 1.944 84.587 0.021 -0.067 3.217 12.417
PODt−1 -0.016 -0.003 0.000 0.099 -0.038 -3.788 0.016 0.005 0.091 0.096
ST PRt−1 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.010 0.006 -0.793 -0.006 -0.001 0.100 0.224
FGDPt -0.342 0.016 0.020 -0.351 2.249 5.134 -1.674 -0.989 45.728 -24.644
FIPDt 1.006 -0.867 0.007 1.975 7.098 20.321 -4.766 -3.157 15.900 -12.678
FHPIt -1.651 -0.107 -0.001 -2.249 4.678 -50.305 0.387 -0.798 -2.255 3.071
FLT IRt -0.008 0.001 0.000 0.342 -0.147 30.492 0.003 0.003 -0.220 -0.252
FLOANt -0.267 -0.022 0.000 0.303 0.242 -18.970 0.129 0.036 2.854 -4.711
FLEVt 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.015 -0.026 -6.985 0.006 0.005 -0.084 0.136
FLIRt 0.066 0.004 0.001 0.020 -0.010 -38.362 -0.007 0.018 -0.027 2.815
FDRt -0.078 -0.005 0.000 0.141 -0.127 14.732 0.082 0.036 0.223 -1.803
FPODt -0.023 0.003 0.000 -0.140 0.227 -24.514 -0.049 -0.045 0.733 -0.174
FST PRt -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.032 -0.046 -4.591 0.027 0.022 -0.203 0.560
FGDPt−1 1.433 0.096 -0.009 -1.873 -2.430 54.600 -1.036 -0.392 -7.280 -1.508
FIPDt−1 -2.373 0.179 -0.022 7.003 22.130 -21.960 2.731 3.407 -10.772 -8.669
FHPIt−1 1.448 0.171 0.010 2.061 -5.496 33.996 -0.061 0.757 -2.219 7.179
FLT IRt−1 -0.024 0.004 0.001 -0.076 0.237 -17.255 0.008 0.000 0.388 -0.255
FLOANt−1 -0.103 -0.022 0.000 0.098 1.557 34.337 -0.221 -0.179 9.704 -6.927
FLEVt−1 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024 -2.356 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.152
FLIRt−1 -0.028 0.012 0.000 -0.177 -0.457 -7.304 0.114 0.041 0.700 0.293
FDRt−1 0.033 -0.007 0.000 -0.152 0.027 -27.990 -0.044 0.014 1.134 -1.446
FPODt−1 0.019 0.002 0.000 -0.092 0.009 -9.735 0.005 0.015 0.052 0.871
FST PRt−1 -0.018 -0.001 0.000 -0.010 0.061 6.045 -0.043 -0.027 -0.062 0.795
